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"Either we trust each other or we don't trust each other .... I have
no problem with audits.... But in the end it comes down to: Do you
trust or don't you trust."
-Terry Wilson, an ADM Executive, to fellow members of an
international price-fixing cartel, at a meeting to set prices and
production volumes in the lysine market1
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2001, manufacturers of dynamic random access mem-
ory chips ("DRAM") were entrenched in a global price-fixing conspir-
acy that spanned more than three years before a criminal investigation
by the United States Department of Justice broke up the cartel. 2 In
spite of their collusion, however, the DRAM industry was struggling. 3
The CEO of Infineon, one of the major DRAM manufacturers, de-
scribed "vicious market pricing" and falling DRAM prices, comparing
the situation to an "Edgar Allan Poe horror story. ' 4 Amid this tur-
moil, DRAM manufacturers turned to each other-their fellow com-
petitors-cum-co-conspirators-and began discussing the creation of
formal joint ventures among themselves. 5
From a classical economic perspective, it might seem paradoxical
that these manufacturers, who had already established collusive agree-
ments on price, would initiate joint ventures among themselves. After
all, joint ventures would presumably create new, additional sources of
1. KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT: A TRUE STORY 216 (2000) [hereinafter
EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT].
2. Laurie J. Flynn, Samsung to Pay Large Fine in Price-Fixing Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2005, at C3.
3. Will Wade, Micron Maintains Focus Amid Shaky DRAM Market, ELEC. ENG'G TIMES, Nov.
5, 2001 (describing the DRAM market as "already hobbled by overcapacity, with demand slip-
ping and prices sliding even more").
4. One-on-One: For Infineon, DRAM is a Matter of Survival, ELECS. SUPPLY & MFG., Dec. 14,
2001 (quoting Ulrich Schumacher, CEO of Infineon).
5. Id. According to Infineon CEO Schumacher, "[t]he semiconductor officials of Infineon and
Toshiba ha[d] a meeting of the minds on the broad concept of how a joint venture might work.
We have to flesh it out ..... Id. In the same interview, Schumacher expressed doubts about the
economic rationale behind "ongoing negotiations between Micron Technology and Hynix Tech-
nology," two other major DRAM manufacturers, "to form some kind of DRAM alliance." Id.
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supply, and thus add capacity to an industry that, in its own view, was
already plagued by low prices and oversupply.6
On the other hand, members of a price-fixing cartel are always sub-
ject to pressures to cheat on their collusive agreement, and joint ven-
tures among the cartel members may have provided a device to
control cheating by cultivating trust among them. Falling prices in the
DRAM market suggest that either demand was slipping precipitously
or, more likely, the cartel was ineffective. Manufacturers may have
been cheating or "chiseling" on their price-fixing agreement, selling
below the minimum prices upon which the cartel had agreed. More
significantly, the cartel may have lacked an effective mechanism for
punishing cheaters. In essence, the cartel-despite the mutual assur-
ances exchanged by its members-likely suffered from a lack of trust.7
The creation of joint ventures among the manufacturers could have
produced exactly the sort of trust the DRAM cartel needed in order
to maximize the manufacturers' supra-competitive profits and evade
prosecution.
This article considers how some joint ventures among competitors
may constitute trust-facilitating devices-mechanisms that establish,
maintain, and reinforce trust between competitors in a concentrated
market. Three conditions make a joint venture particularly effective as
a trust-facilitating device. First, joint ventures often involve an up-
front investment of considerable size by the joint venture partners.
Depending on the structure and operational plans of the joint venture,
this investment may be difficult or impossible to recover if the venture
is terminated by its parents. That sunk cost provides each parent with
some degree of control over its competitors' assets, which can serve
both as an affirmative manifestation of trust between the competitors
and as a looming punitive mechanism, much like posting a bond or
6. See id. Indeed, the interviewer asked Infineon CEO Schumacher, "Aren't you concerned
the additional capacity will flood an already glutted DRAM market with even more chips, just
when supply and demand are starting to come into balance?" Id.; see also 13 HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICA-
TION I 2122b, at 132 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW] (noting that,
"to the extent [a] joint venture involves a new plant, it increases market production capacity
whether or not it increases the number of firms").
7. The fact that one of the major DRAM manufacturers defected to the Justice Department in
exchange for immunity from criminal prosecution strongly suggests that the DRAM cartel suf-
fered from a lack of trust. See Laurie J. Flynn, 34 States to Sue Chip Makers, Charging Broad
Price Fixing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at C8 (noting that "Micron agreed to cooperate with
investigators in exchange for amnesty from criminal charges"); see also infra Part II.B.3.b (dis-
cussing how the Justice Department's corporate amnesty program creates a prisoner's dilemma
which generally can be solved only if sufficiently high levels of trust exist among cartel
members).
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holding a "hostage."' 8 Significant mutual investment may thus deter
partners from competing with each other outside the scope of the joint
venture.
Second, a joint venture may establish a management team com-
posed of executives from each of its parents and thus create an indi-
rect interlocking directorate. 9 On the one hand, members of a price-
fixing cartel are constantly subject to pressures to cheat on their collu-
sive agreement or defect to law enforcement agencies in exchange for
leniency. On the other hand, as co-directors of a joint venture, execu-
tives from each of the cartel members may form business and inter-
personal relationships that overcome the powerful incentives to cheat
or defect. Such relationships may also encourage tacit collusion
among joint venture managers who are not themselves participants in
explicit price-fixing activity.
Third, the joint venture's mission may be somewhat amorphous or
open-ended, and thereby create a substantial ongoing risk shared by
the parents, who are mutually responsible for, and affected by, the
venture's success or failure. This may be the case when the activities
and operations of the joint venture are not strictly articulated at the
time of its formation (as is particularly common for research and de-
velopment joint ventures) or when the management of the joint ven-
ture is not wholly independent from that of its parents (which is often
the case). When this third trust-facilitating device is present, it may be
intertwined with the first and second. Although each of these three
factors may be identified as an independent feature of a joint venture,
they are all closely-related and lead to a common anticompetitive risk:
the facilitation of trust between competitors.
Modern corporate executives have an increasingly firm understand-
ing of the trust-facilitating benefits of forming a joint venture with
one's competitors. For more than a decade now, business-school aca-
demics and the business media have extolled the virtues of "co-opeti-
tion," advocating a role for cooperation between competitors and
warning that unrestrained competition is a mutually destructive
force.' 0 As the authors of a widely-cited book entitled Co-opetition
put it: "Until your rivals live in glass houses, expect them to throw
8. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 298, 310-12 (1987) (suggesting that "joint ventures and product ex-
changes could serve as hostages that commit firms to more effective punishment even before a
breach occurs").
9. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (explaining distinction between indirect
versus direct interlock).
10. ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION: A REVOLUTIONARY
MINDSET THAT COMBINES COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AND THE GAME THEORY STRAT-
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stones. Thus, it's in your interest to help them build a glass house
...* ,,u In other words, "It's important that competitors have some-
thing to lose from getting into a price war."' 12 By forming a joint ven-
ture with its competitors, a company not only helps them build a glass
house but also moves some of its own family members in under the
same roof-in effect, sharing the glass house.
The trust-facilitating features of joint ventures among competitors
are inherently harmful to competition, and in some cases, such an-
ticompetitive harm may outweigh the procompetitive benefits of a col-
laboration. Where a cartel already exists, as in the DRAM industry
example above, joint ventures among competitors may increase the
longevity and effectiveness of the conspiracy. Even if there is no ex-
isting cartel at the time the joint venture is formed, however, the trust-
facilitating effects of a joint venture among competitors may promote
or enable the development of a cartel. Likewise, even if competitors
never enter into an explicit cartel agreement, a joint venture among
competitors may nonetheless facilitate trust and thus encourage tacit
collusion. This last possibility is perhaps most insidious, for unlike sit-
uations in which an explicit agreement exists, tacit collusion is unlikely
to be challenged by antitrust enforcers or condemned by courts under
current antitrust law.
Existing antitrust doctrine fails to consider the risks of trust-facili-
tating devices. 13 Current antitrust law generally focuses only on
whether a joint venture will (1) eliminate a competitor, thus having an
anticompetitive effect comparable to that of a merger, or (2) provide a
cover for collusive conduct or collusion-facilitating devices, such as in-
formation sharing, thus having an anticompetitive effect comparable
to that of a price-fixing cartel. The trust-facilitating effects of joint
ventures, however, neither eliminate competitors nor provide a
"cover" for collusive conduct; rather, they enable and reinforce effec-
tive collusion-collusion that is likely to result in supra-competitive
profits for cartel members.
EGY THAT'S CHANGING 'THE GAME OF BUSINESS (1996) [hereinafter BRANDENBURGER &
NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION].
11. Id. at 88-89.
12. Id. at 137.
13. This Article will focus on the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors
issued jointly by the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Department of Justice, as
well as other frameworks proposed by antitrust scholars for analyzing joint ventures. See FED.
TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf; see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A
Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137
(2001).
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Part II of this Article discusses the anticompetitive consequences of
trust among competitors and highlights the trust-facilitating devices
that may be created by joint ventures among competitors in concen-
trated markets. Part III discusses "co-opetition" and related game-
theory concepts that are increasingly emphasized in modern corporate
strategy, 14 focusing particularly on the book Co-opetition. 5 Part IV
discusses the treatment of joint ventures under modern antitrust doc-
trine generally, as well as the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations
Among Competitors ("Collaboration Guidelines" or "Guidelines")
jintly issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the United States
Department of Justice.16 That section argues that neither the broader
antitrust doctrine regarding joint ventures nor the Guidelines properly
recognize the trust-facilitating risks of joint ventures among competi-
tors. Finally, Part V proposes modifications to the Guidelines that
would expose the anticompetitive risks posed by trust-facilitating de-
vices in joint ventures among competitors.
II. CREATING TACTICAL INTERDEPENDENCE THROUGH JOINT
VENTURES: TRUST-FACILITATING DEVICES
A joint venture between competitors can do more than merely pro-
vide a "cover" for a cartel or a conduit for collusive conduct. Far be-
yond the superficial, a joint venture can undergird and bolster trust
between competitors, redefining their self-interests and motivations,
and thus (1) reinforce the effectiveness of an existing cartel, (2) foster
the creation of a cartel where none existed before, or (3) encourage
tacit collusion in the absence of explicit agreements.
A. Understanding the Anticompetitive Risks of
Trust-Facilitating Devices
Although antitrust doctrine regarding joint ventures is not fully de-
veloped, courts and commentators have long recognized that joint
ventures between competitors may mask anticompetitive conduct or
communication. As early as 1897, the Supreme Court characterized
the railroad joint ventures at issue in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association'7 and United States v. Joint Traffic Association'8 as
scarcely more than fronts for cartels which, lacking a lawful purpose,
14. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. FrC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
17. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
18. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
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should be dissolved by antitrust decree. 19 In 1959, Professors Kaysen
and Turner noted that while "[t]here has been surprisingly little law on
joint ventures ... the sketchy existing law on joint ventures seems to
indicate ... [that] ... a joint venture should be condemned on proof
of specific intent to use it as a vehicle for eliminating competition[.] ' '20
Even in cases where there is no evidence that the purpose of the
collaboration is to reduce competition, antitrust scholars have recog-
nized the potential for joint ventures among competitors to (1) "cre-
ate what amounts to a single-firm monopoly" or (2) "facilitate
collusion. ' 21 A joint venture that integrates the participants so com-
pletely that it amounts to a single-firm monopoly can be examined
like a merger and enjoined under the same legal standards.22 Thus, a
joint venture among competitors (such as a production joint venture)
that essentially amounts to a single-firm monopoly can be analyzed
under the principles of merger analysis, a well-developed area of anti-
trust law.23
Although it is widely-accepted, the notion that a joint venture
among competitors may facilitate collusion is not well-understood or
developed in antitrust law. The risk that such a venture will facilitate
collusion in markets outside the scope of the venture's operations is
known as "spillover. ' '24 Chief among the recognized spillover risks is
the concern that, "[t]hrough their association in the venture, the mem-
bers may gain access to information which makes anticompetitive con-
duct more likely."'25 One commentator suggests, for example, that a
''partner to a research and development joint venture ... may be able
to learn details of their competitors' production costs or sales prices
which facilitate collusion at the production or marketing levels." 26
These information-sharing risks are currently recognized in the C01-
19. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF AN-
TITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 1478a, at 319 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter 7
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW] (citing Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. 290; Joint-Traffic,
171 U.S. 505).
20. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 137 (1959).
21. 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2121a, at 125.
22. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 19, 1478a, at 319.
23. Indeed, Judge Posner went so far as to say that, "[f]or the time being, the history of merger
doctrine is at an end." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 132 (2d ed. 2001).
24. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 20, at 138 (noting the risk that "cooperation in
the joint venture will spill over into collateral restrictive behavior among the joint venturers,
simply as a matter of close association"); Piraino, supra note 13, at 1174 (noting that "D]oint
ventures can also facilitate 'spill over' collusion among their members in markets outside the
scope of a venture's operation").
25. Piraino, supra note 13, at 1174.
26. Id.
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laboration Guidelines, which note that a reviewing agency will "evalu-
ate the extent to which competitively sensitive information concerning
markets affected by the collaboration likely would be disclosed. '27
The Guidelines also recognize a number of other factors relevant to
the incentive of the joint venture partners to compete with each
other.28 For example, the Guidelines encourage assessment of "each
participant's financial interest in the collaboration and its potential
impact on the participant's incentive to compete independently with
the collaboration.' 29 The Guidelines do not address, however, a
closely-related risk that is at the focus of this Article: each partner's
shared financial interest in the joint venture may reduce its incentive
to compete with the other partners in markets outside the scope of the
joint venture's operations.
Scholars have long held a skeptical view about the potential an-
ticompetitive effects of a joint venture on markets beyond the scope
of the venture's operations. Indeed, much of the existing scholarship
on joint ventures views the risks of spillover effects as essentially lim-
ited to markets in which both the joint venture partners and the ven-
ture itself are involved. 30 Commentators often rely on the argument
that, in itself, a joint venture between competitors does not present
any special antitrust problems because, "[a]fter all, any group of firms
can rent a hotel room and purchase a box of cigars."'31 In other words,
they suggest, antitrust laws need not specifically address the intimacy-
enhancing aspects of joint ventures because private communications
among competitors are legal. 32
27. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(e), at 21.
28. Id. § 3.34, at 18-21; see also infra Part IV (discussing how modern antitrust analysis of
joint ventures fails to recognize the risks of trust-facilitating devices).
29. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(c), at 20 (emphasis ad-
ded). The Guidelines note that, "[i]n general, the greater the financial interest in the collabora-
tion, the less likely is the participant to compete with the collaboration." Id.
30. Professors Kaysen and Turner went so far as to argue that "any case in which there is no
close relation between the product of the venture and any of the products of the participants"
should be deemed "presumptively lawful .. " KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 20, at 138. They
suggested the anticompetitive risks in such a situation are as negligible as those in a case where
"neither the joint venture, nor its participants (individually or collectively), nor the venture plus
participants, has substantial market power ..... Id.
31. Stephen V. Bomse, Joint Ventures: Practices in Search of Principles, 915 PLI/CORP 781, 802
(1996).
32. For example, executives at competing firms may be friends who have dinner with each
other, or belong to common social or industry organizations where they fraternize; but unless
and until this conduct involves anticompetitive agreements between the competitors, it is likely
to be perfectly legal. See CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: INTER-
PRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 236 (2006) ("A violation of §1 of the Sherman Act clearly
contemplates that one must conspire or agree with someone else and ... there are limits to the
use of circumstantial evidence in the proof of an agreement.").
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Of course, if a joint venture is involved in markets other than those
of its parents, then the joint venture agreement may ostensibly have
nothing to do with the markets in which the joint venture's parents
compete with each other. Antitrust commentators have largely failed
to recognize, however, that a joint venture may threaten competition
between the parents, irrespective of the particular markets in which
the venture is involved. In other words, the trust-facilitating effects of
a joint venture may harm competition among the venture's parents
even if the joint venture is structured in such a way that it precludes
the long-recognized risks of joint ventures (such as information
sharing) .33
B. Applying Game Theory and Principles of Trust to the
Analysis of Joint Ventures Among Competitors
1. Defining "Trust"
Although the term "trust" is an obvious component of the term
"antitrust," the antitrust field has rarely been concerned with the sort
of trust that is the focus of this Article. The "trust" to which the term
"antitrust" refers is, in the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, "a
body of producers or traders ... organized to reduce or defeat compe-
tition, lessen expenses, and control production and distribution for
their common advantage. '34 This concept of the monopolistic trust is
closely related to the broader legal term "trust," which is generally
concerned with fiduciary relationships. 35 Indeed, the framers of the
legislation that gave rise to the field of antitrust were largely "con-
cerned with the 'trust' problem, ' 36 which referred to the anticompeti-
tive combinations prevalent at the turn of the twentieth century-the
steel trust, the railroad trust, and the oil trust, among others. 3
7
33. The Collaboration Guidelines already recognize, for example, the risk that the parents of a
joint venture may "shar[e] ... information related to a market in which the collaboration oper-
ates or in which the participants are... competitors." FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES,
supra note 13, § 3.31(b), at 15.
34. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining "antitrust" as "opposed to
trusts ... or similar monopolistic combinations" and defining "trust," in the context of antitrust,
as "[a] body of producers or traders in some class of business, organized to reduce or defeat
competition, lessen expenses, and control production and distribution for their common advan-
tage; spec. such a combination of commercial or industrial companies, with a central governing
body of trustees which holds a majority or the whole of the stock of each of the combining firms,
thus having a controlling vote in the conduct and operation of each").
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (8th ed. 1999) (providing multiple definitions of "trust"
as a legal term, such as "a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of
another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary)").
36. POSNER, supra note 23, at 34.
37. See, e.g., Charges Against Members of the House and Lobby Activities of the National
Association of Manufacturers of the United States and Others: Hearings Before the Select Corn-
2008]
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Of course, the fiduciary of a trust owes the "duty of trust" (as well
as the duties of good faith and loyalty) to the trust's beneficiary. 38 But
the legal notion of trust is distinct from the more common usage of the
word with which this Article is concerned. The Oxford English Dic-
tionary provides as its first definition of the word "trust":
"[c]onfidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or
thing, or the truth of a statement. '39 As used in this Article, the term
"trust-facilitating" refers to this broader, general conception of trust.
Professor Cross defines trust as "the voluntary ceding of control
over something valuable to another person or entity, based upon one's
faith in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for
the valuable thing."' 40 As discussed below, this is precisely the situa-
tion that a joint venture between competitors may entail.41 This Arti-
cle will thus adopt Professor Cross's definition of trust as a general
working definition.
2. The Increasing Use of Trust as a Substitute for
Formal Agreements
Trust is increasingly understood among corporate executives as a
lower-cost, higher-value substitute for formal agreements. As Profes-
sor Salbu notes, "[t]rust among collaborators has been found to sup-
port mutual learning, as well as both effectiveness and longevity of
alliance relations." 42 While contracts "provide customized dispute res-
olution functions, sometimes in anticipation of the manifestation of
only a few conflicts or disagreements," trust "strengthen[s] the ability
of transactors to resolve unanticipated disputes without anticipatory
fixation of all rights and duties, or anticipatory creation of an elabo-
rate adjudicatory system. ' 43 Salbu thus suggests that a move away
from formal agreements may be motivated by the fact that "[s]ocial
mittee of the House of Representatives, 63d Cong. 1239 (1913). As noted by Robert H. Bork, "the
word 'trust' originally gained currency to describe anticompetitive combinations because the
trust device was used to gather industries or large parts of them under single ownership or con-
trol." Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 21
(1966).
38. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 658 (defining the term "fiduciary"); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (defining the "duty of loyalty").
39. See OXFORD ENoLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
40. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L. J. 1457, 1461 (2005).
41. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
42. Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contract As a Relationship Management Form, 47
RUTOERS L. REV. 1271, 1311-12 (1995).
43. Id.
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processes like trust are less expensive than formal governance mecha-
nisms because they exploit economies of scope."144
Salbu's work indicates that modern corporate executives increas-
ingly understand and appreciate the potential efficiencies offered by
cultivating trust in business relationships.45 As he explains, "[m]ore
recent trends in business strategy are moving away from the adver-
sarial view of transactions. Accordingly, degrees of both intraindustry
and interindustry competition are being supplanted by cooperation. '46
Indeed, Salbu notes that "strategic thinking in the 1990s has empha-
sized to an unprecedented degree the competitive advantage to be
gained from cooperative rather than competitive micro-level transac-
tions. ' 47 This trend is discussed in greater detail below in Part III,
which considers how one popular business-press book, Co-opetition,48
encourages executives to maximize economic gains by fostering col-
laborative relationships with their competitors. As modern business
strategy increasingly embraces trust as a viable alternative to formal
agreements, the potential trust-facilitating effects of joint ventures be-
come more apparent to-and thus more likely to be exploited by-
corporate executives.
3. Trust Provides the Solution to the Central Challenges
Faced by Cartels
The central problems faced by cartels can broadly be characterized
as variations of the "prisoner's dilemma," which exists when "two par-
ties pursue their own individual interests and act in a rationally selfish
manner, which results in both parties ending up in a worse position
than if they had cooperated and pursued the group's interests instead
of their own."' 49 The presence of such a dilemma will thus generally
result in the "prisoners"-in this context, the cartel members-being
worse off than they would be in the absence of that dilemma. When a
prisoner's dilemma disturbs the functioning or effectiveness of a price-
fixing cartel, the cartel members' customers-or, more broadly speak-
ing, consumers-will benefit.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1299; see also Michael J. Smitka, Contracting Without Contracts: How the Japanese
Manage Organizational Transactions, THE LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 91, 94-96 (1994) (noting
the growing emphasis on trust in transactions).
46. Salbu, supra note 42, at 1299.
47. Id. at 1300.
48. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10.
49. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP.
L. 453, 455 (2006) [hereinafter Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty].
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In the context of a price-fixing cartel, there are two separate pris-
oner's dilemmas that each cartel member may face.50 First, each cartel
member faces a dilemma about whether or not to cheat on the cartel
agreement by producing more than its allotted output or selling at
prices beneath those fixed by the cartel. 51 Second, each co-conspirator
could choose to expose the existence of the cartel to antitrust enforce-
ment authorities in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 52 This
second quandary is closer to the classic conception of the prisoner's
dilemma, but both may be "solved" by the establishment of trust
among the members of a cartel.53 Cartel members also face a third
dilemma (although it is not, strictly speaking, a prisoner's dilemma)
about how many individuals within each firm to involve in the cartel.5 4
As discussed below, the trust-facilitating devices engendered by cer-
tain joint ventures may enable and undergird collusion among com-
petitors by effectively solving the three dilemmas cartels face.
a) The First Prisoner's Dilemma: To Cheat or Not to Cheat?
The first prisoner's dilemma that each member of a price-fixing car-
tel faces is whether to cheat co-conspirators by deviating from the car-
tel agreement. 55 In the short-term, the cheater increases its supra-
competitive profits and decreases those of the non-cheaters. Thus, it
may be in the interest of a cartel member to cheat if that member
believes its co-conspirators are cheating; otherwise, the net effect of
the cartel may be to cede volume and customers to the cheaters. In
the long-run, devious behavior destabilizes the cartel and ultimately
reduces all of the members' supra-competitive profits.56
In theory, a cartel may solve the prisoner's dilemmas through con-
tract, force, or trust.57 While neither formal contracts nor force are
50. Id. at 463.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 462.
54. This third dilemma is proposed by this Author and was not suggested by Professor Leslie.
55. Cheating may take various forms, but can often be described as "chiseling": selling at
prices below the minimum levels agreed upon by the cartel. Depending on the particular an-
ticompetitive agreements made by the cartel, a member may also cheat by producing more prod-
uct than agreed upon, selling to customers other than those agreed upon, selling outside of the
territorial allocation agreed upon, or providing value-enhancing benefits (such as rebates or bet-
ter-quality product) to their customers. See GOE'-Z & MCCHEsNEY, supra note 32, at 84-86 (dis-
cussing various potential methods by which a cartel member might cheat on a price-fixing
agreement).
56. See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 49, at 463.
57. Id. at 461.
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likely to be viable options for a real-world price-fixing cartel,58 the
establishment of some threshold level of trust among cartel members
is an achievable and potentially potent solution to the prisoner's di-
lemma. 59 In other words, "[b]ecause the solution to the prisoner's di-
lemma requires people to cooperate when their individual self-interest
is to defect, it is essentially a game of trust. '60
In addition to its theoretical appeal, empirical studies also support
the notion that trust provides a solution to the prisoner's dilemmas.61
A number of prisoner's dilemma simulation experiments have actually
used a price-fixing-cartel scenario as a factual premise. 62 These studies
suggest that trust between competitors can be established through a
recent past pattern of cooperative behavior which promotes similar
behavior in the future.63
Although trust may provide the most intuitive and promising solu-
tion to the prisoner's dilemmas, trust can prove to be elusive for mem-
bers of a cartel for at least two reasons. First, even if the cartel
members make solemn pledges of loyalty to each other, cheating is
often difficult to detect in the short run.64 In other words, a track re-
cord of recent past cooperative behavior, which is an effective solution
58. On one hand, formal contracts among cartel members would "[permit] the parties to com-
mit to cooperation and [put] teeth into these promises through the imposition of penalties
against a party who defects." Id. On the other hand, courts are unlikely to enforce a contract that
constitutes an illegal anticompetitive agreement among competitors. Id. Thus, formal agree-
ments such as contracts are only a viable solution to the prisoner's dilemma to the extent that
cartels can enforce such agreements through their own enforcement mechanisms-that is, with-
out the aid of the courts and the legal system. Id.
Using force as a solution to the prisoner's dilemma-for example, by implementing a "kill the
[cheater]" strategy-is also an unlikely option for price-fixing conspiracies. Id. While a genuine
threat of violence against cheaters might be an effective deterrent to cheating on the price-fixing
agreement, the executives who orchestrate cartels have thus far not adopted the sort of physi-
cally coercive strategies that one would associate with organized crime. Leslie, Antitrust Am-
nesty, supra note 49, at 461-62.
59. Id. at 462.
60. Id. Indeed, without any level of trust, the prisoner's dilemma would almost certainly result
in the failure of the cartel. As Professor Leslie explains, "[t]he worst outcome for a player in a
prisoner's dilemma scenario is to cooperate when one's partner defects-often called the sucker
outcome." Id.
61. See James P. Gahagan & James T. Tedeschi, Strategy and the Credibility of Promises in the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 12 J. CONFLICr RESOL. 224, 226 (1968); Peter Huber, Competition,
Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Cooperation, 93 YALE L.J. 1147, 1169-72 (1984); Leslie,
Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 49, at 461.
62. See Gahagan & Tedeschi, supra note 61, at 226 (describing results of a study of partici-
pants in a simulated prisoner's dilemma game, which suggested that greater levels of trust lead to
increased levels of cooperation); Huber, supra note 61, at 1169-72.
63. See Gahagan & Tedeschi, supra note 61, at 226; Huber, supra note 61, at 1169-72.
64. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 611-12 (2004)
[hereinafter Leslie, Trust].
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in the prisoner's dilemma simulation experiments, may be difficult to
establish in real-world cartels. Second, even when cheaters are suc-
cessfully detected, it may be still more difficult for the non-cheating
members to effectively punish them.65
Even before the enactment of antitrust laws in the 1890s, the innate
temptation of cartel members to cheat inspired a myriad of elaborate
mechanisms for effectively reducing competition, such as sales quotas
and geographic allocations. 66 The enactment of antitrust laws like the
Sherman Act, 67 however, has made many of these cheating detection
and enforcement mechanisms too risky for the modern price-fixing
cartel.68 For example, a cartel might want to hire a third-party auditor
to ensure that members of the cartel are abiding by the terms of the
price-fixing agreement.69 But to do so would require disclosure of the
conspiracy to an additional group of people, thus creating more poten-
tial witnesses and sources of information for government enforcement
agencies and private plaintiffs.70 Modern price-fixing cartels thus may
be unable to detect or punish cheating. And even when they do, it can
be difficult to punish the cheaters. A cartel may respond to cheating
by expelling that member from the cartel or by dissolving the cartel
altogether. In either case, however, the effect is less a punishment for
the cheater than simply a return to the status quo-a competitive
market. 71
65. Id. at 615-16.
66. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 51. In particular, Posner lists the following mechanisms:
"sales quotas, exclusive sales agencies, industry-wide price-fixing committees, the levying of pen-
alties for infractions, provisions for the arbitration of disputes, the establishment of an investiga-
tive apparatus, product standardization, allocation of customers, and division of geographical
markets." Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
68. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 51-52.
69. See EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT, supra note 1, at 216; J. Anthony Chavez, The Carrot
and the Stick Approach to Antitrust Enforcement, 1542 PLI/CoRP 519, 579 (2006); Leslie, Trust,
supra note 64, at 613.
70. Hiring a third-party auditor would also require the recording and documentation of the
cartel's activities, presumably down to the dollars and cents-evidence that would be particu-
larly lethal in any future antitrust actions against the cartel members.
71. In a sense, the cartel members would be punishing themselves to the same extent as the
cheater, in that they would be forgoing the possibility of the supra-competitive profits that the
cartel was organized to achieve. Alternatively, a cartel might choose to punish a known cheater
even more vigorously through punitive mechanisms such as fines or deliberate price wars. See
Leslie, Trust, supra note 64, at 616-19. Price wars, however, carry a drawback similar to that
entailed by dissolving the cartel: everyone in the cartel, cheating and non-cheating members
alike, shares in the pain of a price war, which eliminates supra-competitive profits and-even
worse-may move prices below what would otherwise be the competitive level.
Cartel members who are joint venture partners could potentially inflict punishments on each
other through their mutual joint venture, and such punishments, if they were ever actually in-
flicted, might also be felt by both the target of the punishment (i.e., the cheater) and the cartel
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b) The Second Prisoner's Dilemma: He Who Defects First Wins
In the criminal antitrust enforcement arena, the United States De-
partment of Justice's Antitrust Division has set up what it calls its
"Corporate Leniency Policy" or "Amnesty Program," which gives im-
munity from criminal prosecution to the first member of a price-fixing
cartel to report the cartel to the Antitrust Division.72 In exchange for
immunity, that first defector must provide its full cooperation to the
Antitrust Division's investigation and prosecution of the other cartel
members.73 The Amnesty Program has thus created an additional pris-
oner's dilemma for members of price-fixing cartels.74
This dilemma presents a substantial obstacle not only to the ongo-
ing viability of an existing cartel, but also to the formation of a cartel
in the first place.75 Like the first prisoner's dilemma, the second can
members inflicting the punishment. Compared to cartel members who are not joint venture part-
ners, however, cartel members who are joint venture partners may be able to punish a cheating
co-conspirator both (a) exponentially more quickly and (b) to a significantly greater magnitude
(in dollar terms). Indeed, using only market-based punitive mechanisms (such as deliberate price
wars), it might take cartel members who are not joint venture partners months or years to inflict
punishment of a magnitude that could potentially be executed in a matter of days or weeks
among cartel members who are also joint venture partners. See infra notes 99-103 and accompa-
nying text.
72. See Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Vio-
lations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 799 (2001).
73. See id. at 798-800.
74. As one writer in Forbes put it: "[a]ttention price-fixers and bid-riggers. Confess and the
U.S. Department of Justice will let you off the hook. But hurry! Only one conspirator per car-
tel." See id. at 798 (quoting Janet Novack, Politics: Fix and Tell, FORBES, May 4, 1998, at 46).
75. As with the "to cheat or not to cheat" prisoner's dilemma discussed above, see supra Part
II.B.3.a, the prisoner's dilemma created by the Amnesty Program also has implications for
whether the cartel members will achieve the supra-competitive profits they seek. After all, if one
member's cooperation with the government leads to the downfall of the cartel, prices would
likely return to competitive levels. But the second prisoner's dilemma has the potential to bring
about adverse financial consequences of such magnitude that they may dwarf the lost supra-
competitive profits. First, the cartel members who are not provided amnesty face the likelihood
of large criminal fines against their respective corporations-fines that may run into the hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, based on a percentage (20-50%) of the volume of commerce that
was affected by the conspiracy. See Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Up-
date on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 275 (1991).
Second, all of the cartel members face the likelihood of civil suits by private plaintiffs, the cus-
tomers, who-after the Justice Department completes its prosecutions-can use the criminal
cases as ready-made roadmaps and obtain treble damages from each of the cartel members.
The additional threat of individual criminal prosecution raises the stakes for the second pris-
oner's dilemma to an entirely new level. If a member of the cartel defects, then, at worst, the
corporation itself can only be fined or, perhaps in an extreme case, dissolved. But, for the indi-
viduals who personally participated in the scheme, there is much more to be lost than money.
The executives and managers who orchestrated and effected the cartel may be punished not only
with criminal fines but also with substantial prison sentences. See Scott D. Hammond, Director
of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fighting Cartels - Why and
How?: Lessons Common to Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity (Sept. 12, 2000) (transcript
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also be solved with trust.76 Many of the same dynamics are at play. For
example, a past pattern of cooperative behavior may promote such
behavior in the future. In the case of the second prisoner's dilemma,
however, the issue of detection and punishment is irrelevant. Once
one member of the cartel defects-which can happen as suddenly and
as swiftly as a phone call to the Justice Department-then the game is
over. The need for trust among competitors is thus even more readily
apparent in the context of the second prisoner's dilemma, which
powerfully counterbalances a competitor's impulse to conspire. 77 In
any case, a high-level of trust among competitors is essentially a pre-
requisite to the formation and functioning of a modern price-fixing
cartel. As discussed below, the trust-facilitating devices created by cer-
tain joint ventures provide effective means for overcoming the second
prisoner's dilemma.
c) The Intra-Corporate Implications of the Prisoner's Dilemmas:
The Need for Institutionalized Trust
Both the first and second prisoner's dilemmas discussed above give
rise to a third, intra-corporate dilemma. Existing antitrust-related
literature treats the members of price-fixing cartels as the "players" in
the prisoner's dilemma game. 78 Previous game-theory-oriented analy-
ses of antitrust cartels, experimental studies of simulated prisoner's
dilemmas, and the classical conception of the prisoner's dilemma have
all largely conceived of the "players" as individuals.79 This framework
has allowed economic, behavioral, and legal theorists to productively
and insightfully analyze the prisoner's dilemma game.80
In reality, however, the members of a typical modern price-fixing
cartel are major multinational corporations, not individual persons.
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/6487.htm). On top of these dire costs, the
individuals who acted for the non-defecting members of the cartel are also likely to face the
collateral consequences of criminal prosecution-loss of job, loss of voting rights, social stigma,
and quite possibly, the inability to ever work again in the industry in which they have made their
career.
76. See Leslie, Trust, supra note 64, at 534-36.
77. The effectiveness of the second prisoner's dilemma is evidenced by the significant number
of major international price-fixing cartels that have been successfully prosecuted subsequent to
the Justice Department's implementation of the Amnesty Program. See Spratling, supra note 72,
at 798-99; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Protecting and Promoting Competition (2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/222725.htm (summarizing recent major international cartel cases
and fines).
78. See Gahagan & Tedeschi, supra note 61; Huber, supra note 61, at 1150, 1169-72; Leslie,
Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 49, at 455-57.
79. See Gahagan & Tedeschi, supra note 61, at 226; Huber, supra note 61, at 1169-72; Leslie,
Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 49, at 455.
80. See studies cited supra Parts II.B.3.a-b.
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Composed of numerous individuals and decision makers, a corporate
"player" is substantially more complex than an individual "player."
This is not to suggest that a corporation is any less rational or self-
interested than an individual actor. But, when a "player" is a corpora-
tion, it adds a new dimension-a third sort of dilemma-to the pris-
oner's dilemmas that cartel members face.
Effectively implementing price-fixing agreements may require that
numerous individuals from each member corporation be knowledgea-
ble about, and actively participate in, the cartel."' In the international
lysine conspiracy in the 1990s, for example, multiple representatives
from each of the member corporations attended the cartel meetings.8 2
Similarly, in the DRAM cartel discussed above, at least four individu-
als at each of three member corporations actively participated in the
criminal conspiracy.8 3 The cartel participants from just one "member"
81. To better understand this third dilemma, it may be helpful to consider the organizational
and operational aspects of the companies that have the greatest incentive to join a price-fixing
cartel. The markets that are most conducive to antitrust conspiracies-and in which a price-
fixing cartel potentially offers the greatest profits-are global commodity product markets that
have a small number of producers and significant barriers to entry, such as chemicals, petroleum
products, and computer chips. The industries in which these markets are situated are generally
composed of a slightly larger, yet still limited, group of large multinational, multi-unit corpora-
tions. See Spratling, supra note 72, at 820-21 ("The Division has learned that, structurally, inter-
national cartels occur in highly concentrated industries with few significant competitors; that
small firms on the fringes do not destabilize an effective cartel; that the cartels sell standardized
products where price competition is more important than other forms of competition; and that
cartels prosper even in the face of large, sophisticated customers."). At the highest levels, these
corporations are generally run by a CEO, a president, and a CFO-each of whom ultimately
answers to a board of directors. One step down from the top-level executives, there is often a
panel of division presidents and vice-presidents-for example, a president of the industrial prod-
ucts division or a vice president of marketing. Finally, at the middle levels, these corporations
may be composed of a multi-tiered hierarchy of individuals responsible for the day-to-day opera-
tions in a given product market-for example, production managers, marketing directors, and
regional sales managers.
Within these corporations, the inherent complexity associated with the function of an effective
price-fixing cartel couples with the complications created by the first and second prisoner's di-
lemmas to create a virtual gauntlet of conflicting forces and contradictory motivations. Even
without factoring in either of the prisoner's dilemmas, the members of a cartel likely will need to
communicate frequently to fix prices, set volume limitations, and coordinate bids on particular
customer's contracts. While this process is relatively simple in comparison to the challenges cre-
ated by the prisoner's dilemmas, this coordination may nonetheless necessitate such frequent
inter-member communication that it requires the involvement of more than one individual from
each of the member corporations.
82. See EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT, supra note 1, at 214 (detailing a meeting in a hotel
room attended by the President of ADM and the Vice President of ADM's Bioproducts Divi-
sion, as well as multiple executives from each of two competitor corporations, Anjinomoto, Inc.
(Japan) and Miwon (Korea)).
83. See Three Executives Indicted for their Roles in the DRAM Price-Fixing & Bid-Rigging
Conspiracy, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at 30-32 (listing the four companies
and sixteen individuals that, as of January 2007, had been indicted in the DRAM conspiracy,
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of the cartel, Samsung Electronics, included, at a minimum, 84 two
vice-presidents of marketing for the parent corporation's memory di-
vision, a vice-president at Samsung's U.S. subsidiary, a senior manager
of DRAM sales, an associate director for DRAM marketing at the
U.S. subsidiary, and a sales director for Samsung's German
subsidiary.85
The first prisoner's dilemma necessitates an intra-cartel mechanism
to detect and punish cheating86 and thus may generate further de-
mands on the cartel in terms of the number of individuals from each
member corporation who are actively involved in the conspiracy. A
member corporation, for example, might use a regional sales manager
to communicate with a counterpart at a competitor corporation about
each member's respective bids at an upcoming reverse auction. Such
communications inevitably add to the cartel-related workload of each
member corporation, and thus require the knowledge and participa-
tion of additional individuals at each of those corporations.
While both the inherent coordination demands of a price-fixing
conspiracy and the cheating-related demands brought about by the
first prisoner's dilemma weigh in favor of involving more individuals
from each member corporation, the second prisoner's dilemma pulls
squarely towards the opposite result. The second prisoner's di-
lemma-whether or not to defect-generates a need for extreme se-
crecy. In the cartel members' ideal world, only one individual at each
member corporation would be knowledgeable about the conspiracy.
Each member of a cartel thus faces an intra-corporate dilemma:8 7
How many individuals within the corporation should be actively in-
volved in or otherwise informed about the conspiracy? As more indi-
viduals within a member corporation are knowledgeable about the
cartel, the level of secrecy necessarily drops. Consequently, the risk of
including twelve individuals that pleaded guilty to antitrust violations); Flynn, Samsung, supra
note 2, at C-3.
84. The positions listed here are those of the individuals that pleaded guilty to participating in
the DRAM cartel. This does not necessarily indicate, however, that these were the only individu-
als at Samsung who were actively involved in the conspiracy. Indeed, when a corporation pleads
guilty to price-fixing charges-as did Samsung-the Department of Justice often provides immu-
nity from individual criminal prosecution to the vast majority of the company's officers and
employees in exchange for their individual cooperation with the ongoing investigation. See
Spratling, supra note 72, at 809-12.
85. See Three Executives Indicted, supra note 83, at 30-32 (listing the four companies and
sixteen individuals that, as of January 2007, had been indicted in the DRAM conspiracy, includ-
ing twelve individuals that had pleaded guilty); Flynn, Samsung, supra note 2, at C-3; Internet:
Time Warner Unloads, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2006, at D-4.
86. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
87. This third, intra-corporate dilemma is more a byproduct of the first two prisoner's dilem-
mas than a prisoner's dilemma in its own right.
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being detected by law enforcement agencies increases. This third, in-
tra-corporate dilemma is, in a sense, a sort of individualized manifes-
tation of the second prisoner's dilemma. Any individual at a member
corporation who is involved in or has knowledge of the cartel's activ-
ity has the potential to defect to the government. An individual may
do so for much the same reason as a member corporation-for exam-
ple, out of fear that someone at another member corporation will de-
fect first.88
As with the first and second prisoner's dilemmas, this third, intra-
corporate dilemma may be solved with trust. For example, within a
given product market, such as DRAM, some threshold level of trust
between competitors would allow for the formation of a cartel in
which only one individual (for example, the vice-president of market-
ing) at each member company actively participates.8 9 But the ongoing
cartelization of that market might, due to logistical complexities of the
sort suggested above, require that six or more individuals at each of
the member companies are actively involved.90 The third dilemma
thus further raises the threshold level of trust required between
competitors.91
Institutionalized trust can help solve these problems. Institutional-
ized trust differs from the commonly understood notion of trust in
that institutions-or, in the context of this article, corporations-
rather than individuals are the primary actors in the trust relationship.
88. See Spratling, supra note 72, at 805-06 ("Each individual acting on behalf of a company
engaged in cartel conduct must ask himself or herself: can I trust my coconspirators to be loyal,
to look out for my company's well being and my personal freedom, by not disclosing our cartel
activities?"). An individual might also be motivated to defect by a crisis of conscience, or as a
bargaining chip (in exchange for immunity or reduced charges) with respect to a separate crimi-
nal prosecution by the Justice Department.
89. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
90. Six active participants at each member company would mean that six times as many indi-
viduals from each cartel-member company are communicating with individuals at other cartel-
member companies (for example, to coordinate prices, volume, bidding, etc.). Consequently, the
individuals at each cartel-member company would have to trust six people (rather than one
individual) at each of the other cartel-member companies if the cartel is to withstand the pris-
oner's dilemmas.
91. To complicate matters further, collateral factors may compound the risks associated with
the third, intra-corporate dilemma and further raise the trust threshold. There may be turnover
within the particular executive and managerial positions that actively participate in the cartel.
For example, each successive vice-president of sales for DRAM will have to be "introduced" to
the cartel and educated on its workings, which requires additional levels of trust. Such turnover
thus may add to the total pool of people who have knowledge of the cartel, thereby threatening
secrecy and raising the required trust threshold yet higher. With each additional individual who
is introduced into the cartel on behalf of a member corporation, an additional trust relationship
is required: in order for the cartel to function, the individuals at the other member corporations
with whom the new individual regularly communicates must develop some threshold level of
trust for that individual.
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Institutionalized trust is closely related to the concepts of "institu-
tional knowledge" and "institutional memory," the knowledge and
memory embedded within an institution, persisting over time, even as
the individuals within the institution turnover. 92 Economists have ar-
gued that institutional memory may lead new managers to repeat the
actions and policies of their predecessors, even if they are unaware of
the rationale for those actions.93 Indeed, this effect is so powerful that
the new managers may continue the actions and policies of their pred-
ecessors for an even longer period of time than the "old managers
with full memory would have continued. '94 Institutionalized trust
could similarly allow new managers at a corporation to adopt the in-
ter-corporate trust relationships of their predecessors-even if the
new managers are ignorant of the decision-making process or ratio-
nale that led to the establishment of that trust.
Institutionalizing trust among competitors makes it easier for indi-
viduals acting on behalf of large companies to internalize the eco-
nomic interests shared by competitors. Institutionalized trust could
thus motivate competitors to act "rationally" in a way that provides
the maximum long-term benefit to all parties-for example, by in-
creasing prices or limiting supply in a given market. As discussed be-
low, the trust-facilitating devices entailed by certain joint ventures
may effectively establish institutionalized trust among competitors.95
By providing some or all of the trust necessary to solve the prisoner's
dilemmas, institutionalized trust could encourage or enable the crea-
tion of, or reinforce already existing, cartels.
4. Institutionalized Trust Also Encourages and
Enables Tacit Collusion
A high level of institutionalized trust among competitors is just as
essential to tacit collusion as it is to cartels. For much the same rea-
sons that trust among competitors can encourage, enable, and rein-
force existing cartels by counteracting the prisoner's dilemmas,
institutionalized trust can also encourage, enable, and reinforce tacit
collusion, which may violate antitrust laws even in the absence of an
explicit cartel agreement. 96
92. See generally David A. Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Institutional Memory, Inertia, and Impul-
siveness (1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com.
93. See id. (suggesting that new managers are aware of their firm's previous actions but not
the rationale for these actions).
94. See id.
95. See infra Part II.B.4 and infra note 97.
96. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 194.
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Even if certain executives and managers within a corporation are
not involved in a cartel, institutionalized trust may still motivate those
individuals to act more consistently with the collective interest of the
joint venture's parents, rather than simply in the short-term interests
of their own corporation.97 The institutionalized trust stemming from
a joint venture thus may motivate anticompetitive conduct by individ-
uals who are not knowing participants in a formal cartel-either by
encouraging, enabling and reinforcing tacit collusion, or by passively
motivating those who are unaware of the existing cartel to act in the
shared interests of the joint venture partners.
C. Trust-Facilitating Devices and Related Factors that
Pose Anticompetitive Risks
This section highlights the features of certain joint ventures among
competitors that may be particularly effective in generating institu-
tionalized trust. First, a joint venture may entail an up-front invest-
ment of significant size by each of the nominal competitors. Second, a
joint venture may create an indirect interlocking directorate among
the competitors. Third, a joint venture may generate ongoing risk of
97. For example, a vice president of sales for commodity X at Alpha Inc. may choose not to
compete aggressively with Beta Corp. in the X market if he knows that Alpha Inc. and Beta
Corp. have a joint venture for the production of commodity Y.
This consequence of institutionalized trust-tacitly anticompetitive conduct by executives and
managers-could also reinforce the effectiveness of an existing cartel of which those executives
and managers are not explicitly aware. Imagine, for example, that Alpha Inc. and Beta Corp. are
the only two producers in the X market, and that these two corporations decide to form a cartel
in the X market. Assume that the need for extreme secrecy (a consequence of the second pris-
oner's dilemma) leads Alpha and Beta to'decide that only two individuals within each member
corporation, the president and the vice president of marketing, will be knowledgeable about the
cartel. Assume further that, as planned at a cartel meeting attended only by the four individual
cartel participants (two from each company), Alpha raises its prices across the boards on com-
modity X. Now assume that reporting directly to the vice president of sales at Beta are five
regional sales managers who are not aware of the cartel but are rationally motivated to win
customers and gain business.
Upon hearing about Alpha's price increase, these regional sales managers at Beta would natu-
rally want to seize the opportunity to steal Alpha's customers. Indeed, it might be difficult for
the vice president of sales at Beta to convey to the sales managers that they may not steal Al-
pha's customers. The vice president might argue that increased prices are good for everyone, or
that stealing customers is not worth the risk of a price war. But it might be particularly difficult
for Beta's vice president of sales to effectively communicate the essential message-"hands off
of Alpha's customers"-without implicitly disclosing the existence of the cartel in the X market.
Now consider, on the other hand, how this situation might be different if Alpha and Beta had
a joint venture for the production of commodity Y. It would be considerably simpler for the vice
president at Beta to explain to his sales managers that they are not to steal customers from
Alpha because Alpha is an ally in another product market. Indeed, if the institutionalized trust
associated with the Alpha-Beta joint venture were well-developed and widely-recognized
among Beta's managers, then the vice president might not have to convey the message at all; it
might be implicitly understood.
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substantial magnitude that is shared among the competitors. Each of
these factors may have the effect of increasing trust, minimizing the
complications posed by the two prisoner's dilemmas and the intra-cor-
porate dilemma, and therefore minimizing the costs and risks associ-
ated with collusion. Each of these three trust-facilitating devices is
discussed below.
1. Significant Mutual Investment in the Joint Venture
The most fundamental trust-facilitating device that a joint venture
may entail is a significant, up-front investment by each of the joint
venture partners. Depending on the structure and operational plans of
the joint venture, these funds may be difficult or impossible to recover
in the event of failure or premature termination by the venture's par-
ents. In addition to sharing an ongoing interest in the venture's finan-
cial success, this sunk cost provides each parent with some degree of
control over its competitors' assets.
Significant mutual investment in a joint venture can facilitate trust
in at least two ways. First, the reciprocal exchange of control over as-
sets may serve as an affirmative manifestation of trust. Indeed, mak-
ing a substantial joint investment means the parents of the venture are
literally realizing the definition of trust: "the voluntary ceding of con-
trol over something valuable to another person or entity, based upon
one's faith in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care
for the valuable thing. '98 Second, a significant mutual investment may
constitute a looming punitive mechanism, much like posting a bond,
which could be invoked at will by either of the venture's parents.99 If
one of the partners were to breach the trust of the other, the latter
could deliberately mismanage the joint venture to the detriment of the
former.100 Indeed, the latter partner may do so even if the breach oc-
curred in the context of competition outside the scope of the joint
venture.' 0
Imagine, for example, that Alpha Inc. and Beta Corp. compete in
the market for product X and the two companies are equal partners in
Alphabeta Co., a joint venture to produce product Y, the market for
which is distinct from that of product X. Assume that Alpha raised
prices on product X pursuant to a cartel agreement with Beta. If Beta
98. Cross, supra note 40, at 1461; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 8, at 298, 310-12 (suggesting that "joint ventures and product
exchanges could serve as hostages that commit firms to more effective punishment even before a
breach occurs").
100. See id. at 298, 311.
101. See id.
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were then to use the opportunity to steal Alpha's customers in the X
market, Alpha could retaliate by using Alphabeta to punish Beta. For
example, Alpha might use its fifty percent control to deliberately mis-
manage Alphabeta-perhaps by pushing the joint venture to sell fin-
ished products to Alpha Inc. at a below-margin price or, similarly, to
buy raw materials from Alpha Inc. at an inflated price. Of course, in
theory, Beta could remedy either course of retaliation through legal
action against Alpha for breach of fiduciary trust or a similar claim.
10 2
Given the enormous costs that would result if law enforcement au-
thorities, plaintiffs' attorneys, or customers became aware of the car-
tel, however, Beta would be unlikely to risk a court battle and the
extensive discovery that would undoubtedly entail.
In any case, the particular manner in which either of the parent
companies might use the joint venture to punish the other for cheating
on the price-fixing agreement is an issue that they will, in all likeli-
hood, never have to face. Indeed, their mutual investment in the joint
venture is so effective in enabling and reinforcing the cartel because it
makes the prospect of a falling out between the two companies so
intractable. In essence, the substantial mutual investment makes the
potential cost of a breakdown so high that cheating would be reckless
and unwise.103
Analyzing whether mutual investment constitutes a trust-facilitating
device requires comparing the size of the investment to the size of
each company's interest in the market in which the joint venture part-
102. See id. at 311. Professor Ayres suggests that:
When the joint venture is run as a corporation separate from the co-investors, state
corporate law protects the co-investors from actions that profit one at the expense of
others. Actions that generally reduce the value of the joint venture, however, will be
largely immunized by this business judgment rule.
Id. at 311 n.76 (citations omitted).
103. One might argue that the potential cost of a breakdown in the relationship of the co-
conspirators would be so high for all of the joint venture's parents-including both the cheater
who is the target of the punishment and the non-cheaters who are effecting the punishment-
that using the joint venture as a punitive mechanism against cheating would not be a credible
threat. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the mutual joint venture can be used as a
mechanism to effect cartel-related punishments of varying degrees. Unlike, for example, nuclear
warfare, which is generally not seen as a credible threat against non-nuclear military engage-
ments (e.g., the potential for nuclear attack by the United States against the Soviet Union would
not have been a credible threat against a Soviet ground invasion of Vietnam), the mere use of
the mutual joint venture to punish a co-conspirator who is cheating on the cartel agreement can
be done on a small scale (as a warning shot) or on a large scale. That is, the mutual joint venture
may establish a potential for inflicting severe punishment, but this punishment could be doled
out in whole or in part. The mutual economic exposure created by a joint venture among com-
petitors thus remains a credible threat because inflicting punishment through the joint venture,
unlike the mutually assured destruction entailed by nuclear war, is not an all or nothing
proposition.
2008]
86 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
ners are competitors. For example, if a company's investment in the
joint venture is equal to or greater than fifty percent of that com-
pany's gross annual sales in the market in which the parents compete,
that investment would certainly be significant with respect to the com-
petitive market. In such a case, a complete loss of its investment in the
joint venture would cost the company as much as half a year of sales
revenue in the market in which it competes with its joint venture part-
ner-an amount which, depending on the company's operating mar-
gins, might well be equal to a year or more of its operating profits
from that market. Indeed, a percentage ratio as small as ten percent
might still be considered significant if operating margins in the com-
petitive market are particularly low. 10 4 This analysis essentially consid-
ers the size of each parent's investment (including the initial
investment and ongoing or future commitments to invest) in the joint
venture relative to the gross annual revenue of that parent's business
in the market in which it competes with another parent. The greater
the parents' investments in the joint venture relative to their respec-
tive interests in the competitive market, the greater the anticompeti-
tive risks.
Take, for example, Gustafson, Inc., a joint venture formed in 1998
between Crompton & Knowles Corp. and Bayer Corp. Bayer in-
vested at least $140 million into the joint venture, which produces
seed treatment products. 10 5 Within the same time frame, Crompton,
Bayer, and a third company, Flexsys, were the three dominant produc-
ers of an entirely separate group of products known as rubber chemi-
cals. 106 In the global market for rubber chemicals, which had annual
sales totaling more than half a billion dollars,10 7 Crompton and Bayer
each had up to a twenty percent market share, while Flexsys had thirty
104. At first glance, either a company's operating profit or, similarly, its net profit from the
competitive market might seem to be a better comparator than gross sales revenue. Such profit
indicators, however, can vary dramatically from year to year, or even quarter to quarter, and are
thus too volatile to provide a meaningful metric when compared to the mutual investment. Gross
sales revenue, on the other hand, is often relatively stable over time for a given company, partic-
ularly among the larger players in global commodity markets of the sort that are most suscepti-
ble to cartelization. See supra note 81.
105. Joseph Chang, Bayer Increases US Investments to $ 15 Billion, CHEM. MKT. REP., Apr. 5,
1999, at 1. Bayer Corp. is the U.S. subsidiary of Bayer AG, a Germany company.
106. See Commission Decision: Rubber Chemicals (EC) Case No. COMP/F/C.38.443, 2006
O.J. (L353/50) § 2, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_353/1353
20061213en00500053.pdf.
107. See Robert Westervelt, 2002 Forecast: What's On the Radar Screen, CHEM. WEEK, Jan. 2,
2002, at 20 (showing that global sales of rubber chemicals in 2001 totaled $680 million, with an
annual growth forecast of 2% per year, which suggests that annual sales in 1998 were roughly
between $500 million and $680 million).
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percent.10 8 Thus, Crompton and Bayer each had annual sales of
roughly $100 million in the rubber chemicals market. Analyzing either
Crompton or Bayer's mutual investment in the Gustafson joint ven-
ture as a potential trust-facilitating device with respect to competition
in the rubber chemicals market would therefore proceed as follows:
$140 million (investment in the joint venture)
= 140%
$100 million (gross annual sales in the competitive market)
Each company's investment in the joint venture thus represented
140% of its annual sales in the market in which the companies com-
peted-a highly significant mutual investment.
In order to determine whether this investment posed an anticompe-
titive risk, it is necessary to consider the concentration of the affected
market. As discussed below, the risk of anticompetitive effects within
a given market is only relevant if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI"s) indicates that the concentration level of the relevant market
is high.109 The market for rubber chemicals has an HHI of over
1800,110 and would thus be considered a "highly concentrated" indus-
try."' Such a significant mutual investment among competitors in a
highly concentrated industry poses a substantial trust-facilitating risk
and, therefore, a serious threat to competition. As explained below, 1
12
this risk must be weighed against any procompetitive benefits to de-
termine whether the joint venture should be condemned under the
antitrust laws. Nonetheless, the Gustafson joint venture between
Crompton and Bayer created a potent trust-facilitating device and
thus should be presumed unlawful under the framework for antitrust
analysis of joint ventures proposed by this Article. 113
108. See Rubber Chemicals, supra note 106.
109. See infra Part IV.A.I.b.
110. See Rubber Chemicals, supra note 106. The European Commission's decision in the Rub-
ber Chemicals case estimates each company's share of the global market for rubber chemicals as
up to 30% for Flexsys, up to 20% for Crompton & Knowles, up to 20% for Bayer, and up to
10% for General Quimica, a fourth competitor. Considering only these four producers-which
make up 80% of the total market-the HHI would be calculated as follows: (30)2 + (20)2 + (20)2
+ (10)2 = 1800. The rubber chemicals market thus has an HHI of at least 1800, before even
considering the increase in the HHI that would inevitably be contributed by the remaining 20%
of the producers in the market, which are not accounted for in this calculation.
111. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1.5 (1997) [hereinafter FTC-DOJ, MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl.html.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 188-189.
113. For additional discussion of the Gustafson joint venture between Crompton & Knowles
and Bayer, see infra text accompanying notes 266-272.
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2. Creation of an Indirect Interlocking Directorate
If a joint venture establishes a management team composed of ex-
ecutives from each of its parents, it may create another trust-facilitat-
ing device. In such a case, the joint venture creates an indirect, as
opposed to direct, interlock, 114 and thus does not run afoul of the per
se prohibition against direct interlocking directorates among competi-
tors set out in Section 8 of the Clayton Act."15 Nonetheless, the indi-
rect interlock created by a joint venture among competitors raises
many of the same problems that Congress intended to remedy when,
at President Wilson's request, it passed the Clayton Act. Wilson urged
Congress to enact "laws which will effectually prohibit and prevent
such interlockings of the personnel of the directorates of the great cor-
porations ...as in effect result in making . . . those who affect to
compete in fact partners and masters of some whole field of
business."116
Previous commentators have noted that a direct interlocking direc-
torate may create trust between competitors through at least two
mechanisms. First, the financial interdependence of the interlocking
companies reduces "the risk of one partner selling out the other be-
cause each partner has a stake in the other's financial success.""a17 Sec-
ond, placing directors from competing companies in the same
boardroom results in increased transparency." 8 Both of these conse-
quences are equally plausible in the context of an indirect interlocking
directorate.
An interlocking directorate may likewise promote cooperative,
trusting relationships between representatives of each competitor. As
evidenced by the prisoner's dilemma research discussed above,119
"perhaps the best indicator of whether a player will cooperate in the
future is whether she cooperated before.' 120 An interlocking director-
ate may bring together competitors' high-ranking executives to work
114. Whereas a direct interlock occurs when a director serves concurrently on the boards of
two competing corporations, an indirect interlock occurs "where each of two corporations has a
director on the board of a third corporation." STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH
CONG., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, at 26 (1965) [hereinafter H.
COMM., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS].
115. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2000).
116. H. COMM., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS, supra note 114, at 16.
117. Leslie, Trust, supra note 64, at 583.
118. Id. (suggesting that an interlocking directorate effectively "place[s] a director on a cartel
partner's board" so that "each cartel member has an observer in place who can monitor activities
such as plans to reduce price, expand capacity, or introduce new products that could undermine
the cartel agreement").
119. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
120. Leslie, Trust, supra note 64, at 542.
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as close associates towards a common goal.121 Indeed, serving to-
gether on the same board of directors allows executives from compet-
ing companies to formally convene on a regular basis and make
decisions in an official capacity in pursuit of a common end-the in-
creased profitability of the joint venture. These are nearly the same
activities in which representatives of cartel members engage, though
cartel participants must do so informally, unofficially, and in secrecy.
An indirect interlocking directorate thus provides an ideal and-
unless the joint venture is condemned by antitrust enforcers-poten-
tially legal training ground for cartel participants. The practice envi-
ronment provided by the joint venture's boardroom is a real-life trial
run involving a corporation's profitability, the results of which will
likely impact both the personal compensation and the career trajec-
tory of the individuals who serve on the joint venture's board. These
individuals have a strong and natural motivation to cultivate trust
among themselves, irrespective of any competitive markets in which
the joint venture's parents may compete.
Analysis of an interlocking directorate as a potential trust-facilitat-
ing device requires a close look at the structure of the joint venture's
board. First, it is important to consider which entities or individuals
have an ownership interest in the joint venture and in what propor-
tion. Do the competitors own equal shares of the joint venture, as in
the Gustafson example discussed above,122 in which Crompton and
Bayer each owned half of the joint venture? 123 Are there other enti-
ties or individuals who also have ownership stakes in the joint ven-
ture? If no investors other than the competitors have a significant
stake in the joint venture, the interlocking directorate may serve as an
even more effective training ground and thus a more powerful trust-
facilitating device.
Second, it is important to consider how the board of directors and
managers of the joint venture are chosen. Does each parent have the
power to appoint half of the venture's directors? The more balanced
the management of the joint venture, the more likely it is to effec-
tively facilitate trust. Whether any of the joint venture's directors or
121. One might argue that, from an antitrust perspective, this situation is no more inherently
risky than, say, allowing the same competitors' executives to play together on a competitive
softball team. But that argument overlooks the essential dissimilarity between a recreational
activity such as playing for the same softball team versus participating together in a price-fixing
cartel. The argument also fails to recognize the key similarities between serving on the same
board of directors and participating together in a price-fixing cartel.
122. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
123. See Patricia Van Arnum, Bayer and Cyanamid Add to Growing List of Crop-Protection
Deals, CHEM. MKT. REPORTER, Nov. 2, 1998.
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managers also serve simultaneously in management roles at the parent
companies is also important. For example, one of the joint venture's
parents might appoint its president to serve concurrently as a director
of the joint venture, which further increases the likelihood of facilitat-
ing trust between the parent-competitors.
Finally, it may also be worthwhile to consider the standard length of
a joint venture director's appointment, as well as the basis on which a
director may be removed from the board. An interlocking directorate
may pose less of a trust-facilitating risk if, for example, a director can
be removed only by the unanimous vote of both of the joint venture's
parent companies (as opposed to the whim of the particular parent
company who appointed that director). This is particularly true if the
board is composed of individuals who do not simultaneously hold
management positions at the parent company and thus are potentially
able to exercise some degree of independent judgment.
3. Sharing Substantial, Ongoing Risk and Employing
"Strategic Ambiguity"
A joint venture among competitors may entail a third trust-facilitat-
ing device if it establishes a substantial and shared ongoing risk among
its parents. Under current frameworks for antitrust analysis of joint
ventures, risk-sharing with one's competitors is often seen as a
procompetitive virtue.124 It is also a particularly effective device, how-
ever, for building trust among competitors. Where present, this device
is likely intertwined with significant mutual investment and interlock-
ing directorates, though it may facilitate trust even further.
Although difficult to quantify, a substantial, ongoing risk is created
by, for example, "the uncertain costs and benefits" that a research and
development joint venture entails.125 In such an undertaking, future
funding requirements may be imprecisely defined in the joint venture
agreement or subject to future negotiation by the joint venture's par-
ents. Or, the venture may have only a slim chance of developing a
viable product or process that will generate future returns.
Sharing of substantial, ongoing risk is more likely where the mission
and operations of the joint venture are not strictly articulated at the
124. See infra Part IV.A.4. More specifically, however, risk-sharing in itself is not virtuous;
rather, it is risk-sharing that allows two firms to "form a joint subsidiary to undertake an activity
too risky for either parent alone" that provides procompetitive benefits. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION I 703c, at 157 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAw].
125. See Ivan K. Fong & John K. Walker, International High-Technology Joint Ventures: An
Antitrust and Antidumping Analysis, 7 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 57, 63 (1989).
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time of the joint venture's formation. Again, a research and develop-
ment joint venture might entail this sort of risk because when the ven-
ture is created it may not have a well-defined end product, which
makes it difficult to structure the venture's goals, activities, and
operations. a26
Professor Geis has suggested that parties may intentionally "employ
strategic ambiguity" in the terms of a major deal in order to "cultivate
a cordial working relationship. ' 127 He uses the example of a merger to
illustrate his idea,128 but the proposition may be even more relevant to
a joint venture agreement.
Geis suggests that strategic ambiguity may be used to "increase
joint surplus. ' 129 To support this proposition, he first cites Co-opeti-
tion,130 a business-press book which is discussed at length below, for
its discussion of "strategies to 'stir up the fog' in business transac-
tions.' 31 Geis thus recognizes that strategic ambiguity is promoted in
the mainstream as a viable business strategy. He also cites two sepa-
rate economic papers for the more substantive proposition that "pur-
posefully indefinite contracts . . . might increase joint surplus. ' 132 The
fact that strategic ambiguity is both a recognized business strategy and
a potentially viable mechanism for increasing joint surplus confirms
the anticompetitive threat it poses as a trust-facilitating device.
A joint venture agreement that employs strategic ambiguity is likely
to entail substantial, ongoing risk shared by the joint venture's par-
ents, and thus to threaten competition. One sort of strategic ambiguity
in a joint venture agreement among competitors is a lack of explicit
termination provisions. The absence of a well-defined exit plan-in
case any or all of the joint venture's parents wanted out of the ven-
ture-substantially raises the level of ongoing risk shared by the
competitors.
126. Cf. Anthony L. Clapes, Blinded by the Light: Antitrust Analysis of Computer Industry
Alliances, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 904-05 (1993) (discussing the related difficulty of conducting a
market analysis of a research joint venture amidst uncertainty about what product, if any, the
research joint venture will ultimately produce).
127. See George S. Geis, An Embedded Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1664, 1680-82 (2006).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See infra Part III.
131. See Geis, supra note 127, at 1681 n.86 (quoting BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-
OPETITION, supra note 10, at 222-28).
132. See id. (citing B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and
Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902, 902-04 (1998); Birger Wernerfelt, Incomplete Con-
tracts and Renegotiation, MIT SLOAN WORKING PAPER No. 4506-04 (2004), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com).
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Determining whether a joint venture employs strategic ambiguity or
creates substantial, ongoing, shared risk is more difficult and less pre-
cise than analyzing the first two trust-facilitating devices. After all,
every business, and thus every joint venture, involves some degree of
risk. Thus it may be worthwhile to briefly contrast two hypothetical
joint ventures among competitors, the first of which entails substan-
tial, ongoing risk shared by the competitors and the second of which
does not.
The joint venture agreement for JV-A, a research and development
joint venture between two computer chip manufacturers, has open-
ended terms and vaguely-worded termination provisions, requires
substantial up-front and ongoing investments, and has the potential
for substantial long-term losses or profits. The joint venture agree-
ment for JV-B, a grain-trading business-to-business marketplace joint
venture among five grain producers, prescribes strict rules regarding
the rights and privileges of each joint venture partner, including ex-
plicitly defined termination provisions, requires only modest invest-
ment by each partner, and has the potential for only limited losses or
profits.
JV-A creates a substantial, ongoing risk shared among the competi-
tors because: (1) the organizational and operational parameters of the
venture employ strategic ambiguity, requiring the parents to retain
substantial discretion in its ongoing operation; (2) the agreement does
not provide a clean exit plan for either of the parents in the event of
changed circumstances, such as a breakdown in the parents' relation-
ship; and (3) the profitability of the venture is so uncertain and the
potential costs so great. JV-B, on the other hand, does not create a
substantial, ongoing risk because: (1) the agreement strictly limits the
extent to which any of the venture's parents can unilaterally meddle in
its operations; (2) the agreement provides a clearly-defined exit plan
in the event that one of the parents decides to end its affiliation with
the joint venture; and (3) the maximum potential profits or losses to
any individual parent are insubstantial.
As these illustrations demonstrate, analyzing whether a joint ven-
ture creates a substantial, ongoing, shared risk depends on a number
of factors. In some cases the various considerations may weigh in op-
posite directions so that the analysis is indeterminate, but many ven-
tures will clearly fall closer to one end of the spectrum than the other.
A joint venture that entails shared, ongoing risk as substantial as that
of JV-A would no doubt exceed the threshold level necessary to con-
stitute a trust-facilitating device.
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D. Aggregate Trust-Facilitating Effects Arising from Webs of Joint
Ventures Among Competitors Within an Industry
Multiple joint ventures among competitors in a given industry may
pose even greater anticompetitive risks, forming a web of trust-facili-
tating devices among the competitors. Economists have suggested that
competitors may "exchange hostages (for example, by posting bonds
or creating sunk costs) to keep each other from breaching their agree-
ment."'1 33 Professor Williamson, for example, developed the notion of
"credible commitments," which involve "reciprocal acts designed to
safeguard a relationship.' '134 Williamson focused much of his analysis
on webs of product exchange agreements that existed in the mid-1970s
among petroleum producers in the United States and Canada. 35 In
any single agreement, one petroleum producer would agree to a recip-
rocal supply agreement with another. Williamson suggested that these
exchange agreements created "a web of interdependencies among
these firms, thereby helping to effect an oligopolistic outcome in an
industry that was relatively unconcentrated on normal market struc-
ture criteria."'1 36
The mutual investment involved in a joint venture among competi-
tors137 could constitute a credible commitment much like the product
exchanges in the petroleum industry. For example, two competitors'
common investment in a small joint venture-a relatively insignificant
anticompetitive risk standing alone-may be compounded if other
competitors within the same market have similar joint ventures with
each other. In other words, an array of trust-facilitating devices cre-
ated by a web of minor joint ventures within a single industry may
have a cumulative anticompetitive effect of substantial magnitude.
Similarly, a web of joint ventures among competitors, each of which
creates one or more trust-facilitating devices, could pose a substantial
anticompetitive risk even if the affected market appears to be rela-
tively unconcentrated based on standard market structure criteria.
133. See Ayres, supra note 8, at 298, 310 (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 163-206 (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Us-
ing Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 519 (1983)).
134. Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 133, at 519.
135. Id. at 533-37.
136. Id. at 533.
137. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing how a significant mutual investment in a joint venture
among competitors may facilitate trust among the joint venture's parents).
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III. CORPORATE AMERICA'S EMBRACE OF THE PRINCIPLES
BEHIND TRUST-FACILITATING DEVICES: CO-OPETITION AND
THE EMERGENCE OF GAME THEORY CONCEPTS AS
BUSINESS-SCHOOL FUNDAMENTALS
Over the past ten years, a recent trend among business-school aca-
demics and the business press has been the introduction of game the-
ory concepts into modern corporate strategy. This part highlights the
anticompetitive principles underpinning much of the infusion of game
theory strategy into the corporate world. In particular, this section
considers the anticompetitive teachings of the book Co-opetition, the
title of which comes from an amalgamation of the words "coopera-
tion" and "competition."'' 38 Although joint ventures are not its focus,
the book promotes anticompetitive principles and counsels executives
to embrace exactly the sort of trust-facilitating devices highlighted by
this Article. Co-opetition and the corporate strategy trend it repre-
sents are thus likely to motivate corporate executives to use joint ven-
tures as devices to create and maintain tactical interdependence
between competitors.
A. The Increasing Significance and Influence of "Co-opetition" and
Related Game Theory Concepts Among Corporate Executives
Co-opetition, co-authored by Adam Brandenburger, a professor at
Harvard Business School, and Barry J. Nalebuff, a professor at the
Yale School of Management, popularized the concept of "competing
and cooperating at the same time."1 39 Co-opetition enjoyed success as
a business-press best-seller 140 and received public praise from business
leaders such as the CEO of Intel, Andrew S. Grove, managing execu-
tives at Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns, the CEO of insurance titan
General Re, and a Nobel laureate in economics, Kenneth Arrow.14'
138. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 4-5.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Hardy Green, The Business Week Best-Seller List, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 26, 1996,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/1996/35b349025.htm (listing Co-opetition in twelfth
place on the hardcover bestseller list); Hardy Green, The Business Week Best-Seller List, Bus.
WEEK, Sept. 30, 1996, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1996/40/b349538.htm (listing
Co-opetition in tenth place on the hardcover bestseller list, and also noting that the "games"
discussed in the book are not mere child's play: "The book's case studies are for real-and lots
more useful.").
141. See BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at preamble and back
cover of dust jacket. William Barnett, a director at premiere management consulting firm McK-
insey & Co remarked that, "Co-opetition shows you how to benefit from both aspects of business
[competition and cooperation]: how to make a bigger pie, as well as get a bigger share of the pie.
These practical insights from game theory are helping companies find more profitable business
strategies." Id. at back cover of dust jacket.
[Vol. 7:63
THE UNRECOGNIZED RISKS OF JOINT VENTURES
Co-opetition also received substantial attention from the business me-
dia and has been widely cited with little, if any, criticism in the pub-
lished articles of both legal scholars and business-school academics.142
The game-theory-inspired strategies promoted in Co-opetition have
thus become part of the modern canon of corporate strategy. 43
B. The Anticompetitive Underpinnings of Co-opetition
Many of the strategies promoted in Co-opetition are, at their core,
anticompetitive. Among its insights, Co-opetition encourages execu-
tives to view opponents as potential allies, to avoid price wars at all
costs, and to avoid the "hidden costs" of competitive bidding.
Throughout Co-opetition, the authors extol the virtues of exercising
monopoly power and undersupplying product markets. Indeed, one of
the book's central themes is the notion of "finding ways to make the
pie bigger rather than fighting with competitors over a fixed pie. 1' 44
The authors present this as "a different way of thinking about busi-
ness," but the idea of enlarging rather than fighting over the pie is as
old as the steel and oil trusts that inspired the enactment of antitrust
laws more than a century ago. 145 It is a strategy that has long been
pursued by oligopolists and price-fixing cartels alike, a mindset that
could just as readily be characterized by the words "concentration" or
"collusion," as by the newly minted "co-opetition."
The authors of Co-opetition advocate four particular strategies that
are, in essence, anticompetitive. First, readers are encouraged to view
competitors not as opponents or enemies, but as potential allies, and
to look for opportunities for cooperation with competitors.1 46 Two of
the most obvious ways to cooperate with competitors are, of course, to
cartelize or to form a joint venture. Second, the authors celebrate the
benefits of monopoly power and undersupplying a market.147 In the
142. A search on Westlaw alone returns more than 35 legal journal articles that have cited Co-
opetition, and Google Scholar shows that at least 121 social science papers and books have cited
the book. See Westlaw: Journal & Law Review Database, available at www.westlaw.com (last
searched March 1, 2007); Google Scholar: Nalebuff, Co-opetition, available at http://scholar.
google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&cites=12708396891929440629.
143. See, e.g., Jeff Pelline, Coopetition Gaining Acceptance, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 23, 1998,
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-209388.html?legacy=cnet.
144. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 14.
145. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
146. See BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 262.
147. Id. at 111-22. In a section entitled "Added Value of a Monopoly," the authors use the
story of videogame-maker Nintendo during the late 1980s and early 1990s as an exemplar of
astute corporate strategy. They explain that, "[t]hat's why Nintendo did so well: while monopoly
by itself is nice, monopoly and shortage is twice as nice. The Nintendo story demonstrates the
potent effects of undersupplying customers." Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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context of a joint venture among competitors, the combination of (a)
the trust-facilitating devices highlighted by this Article and (b) a mu-
tual appreciation that a market shortage is better than a surplus, poses
a serious threat to competition.
Third, the authors implore readers not to be "the spoiler"-espe-
cially when market shares and pricing are at an equilibrium-and,
above all, to avoid inciting a price war. 148 The underlying lesson here
seems to be a subtle endorsement of the philosophy that-to quote
from ADM's unofficial business philosophy prior to a rash of criminal
and civil antitrust actions against it in the mid-1990s-"the competi-
tors are our friends." 149 In a chapter entitled "Friend or Foe," the au-
thors quote the words of Michael Corleone from the movie The
Godfather, Part II: "Keep your friends close, but your enemies
closer.' 150 In other words, a prudent executive should try to cultivate
cooperative relationships among his or her competitors. As discussed
above, the trust-facilitating devices created by certain joint ventures
are highly-effective mechanisms for developing cooperative relation-
ships among competitors.' 51
Fourth, an entire section of Co-opetition is devoted to what it terms
the "Eight Hidden Costs of Bidding"152-the "hidden costs associated
with making a competitive bid."'1 53 As much as revealing the so-called
"hidden costs," however, this part of the book is an admonition to
corporate executives to strictly avoid competitive bidding as a way to
win new business.' 54 Indeed, the authors do not suggest that there are
any positive aspects to competitive bidding.
The last of the eight "hidden costs" is perhaps the most pertinent to
the trust-facilitating devices created by joint ventures: "Don't destroy
your competitors' glass houses."'1 55 The underlying message here is
that "[l]owering your competitor's profits isn't necessarily smart.' 56
148. See id. at 226-27 (criticizing TWA's decision to be "the spoiler" by "cut[ting] prices and
steal[ing] share" and thus inciting a price war at a time when airline ticket prices were otherwise
likely to stabilize due to increased pricing transparency).
149. EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT, supra note 1, at 51 (2000). In full, ADM's unofficial
motto was "[t]he competitors are our friends, and the customers are our enemies." Id.
150. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 36. The authors urge
reader's to understand that "once competitors enter the game, you can have win-win interactions
with them," and that there are "many times when the best strategy is to let competitors succeed
as competitors." Id. at 38.
151. See supra Parts II.C.1-3.
152. BRANDENBUR OER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 86.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 86-88.
155. See id. at 89.
156. See id. at 88.
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Rather than the "lose-lose" of a price war, the authors encourage the
reader to "think Co-opetition":
If you lower your rival's profits, he then has less to lose and every
reason to be more aggressive. He can go after your existing ac-
counts with abandon. In contrast, the more money your rival is
making, the more he has to lose from getting in a price war. Until
your rivals live in glass houses, expect them to throw stones. Thus,
it's in your interest to help them build a glass house .... 157
Each of the three trust-facilitating devices highlighted by this article
provides an ideal building block for the construction a glass house,
allowing competitors to establish and maintain mutual vulnerabili-
ties.158 Thus, by forming a joint venture with one's competitors, a busi-
ness not only helps them build a glass house, but it also moves some of
its own family members in under the same roof-in effect, sharing the
glass house.
C. Co-opetition's Unsubtle Disdain for Antitrust
Laws and Enforcers
Throughout the book, the authors of Co-opetition evince a disdain
for antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement agencies. A long-recog-
nized hallmark of cartel behavior is the establishment of a social norm
among the co-conspirators that expresses contempt for antitrust
laws.159 As one commentator notes, "a social norm that belittles anti-
trust principles can become so pervasive that executives fail to appre-
ciate that antitrust violations are illegal" and believe what they are
doing is not wrong.160 Throughout Co-opetition, commentary on the
antitrust legal regime is unfailingly negative. The authors suggest that
the antitrust laws are not procompetitive but intrusive and burden-
some.1 61 While the authors do not overtly counsel violation of U.S.
antitrust laws, 162 their commentary suggests that it may sometimes be
157. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 89.
158. See supra Parts II.C.1-3.
159. Leslie, Trust, supra note 64, at 587.
160. Id.
161. See BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 194-95 (sug-
gesting, for example, that the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") "appears to operate from a
mental model perhaps more relevant to a bygone era of smokestack industries," and "tends to
challenge practices that allow companies to sustain prices above variable cost-so-called facili-
tating practices").
162. The authors go so far as to provide a disclaimer that: "[t]o our knowledge, none of the
contracts we've discussed raise antitrust concerns. But the laws change and interpretations vary,
and we recommend that you consult with legal counsel." Id. at 192.
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prudent to break the rules and that the benefits of breaking the anti-
trust laws may outweigh the penalties.1 63
Co-opetition is structured as a book of lessons and practical advice
illustrated by real-world examples. In teaching corporate executives
how to exploit the potential for cooperative relationships within the
competitive marketplace, the authors often cast videogame-maker
Nintendo as a real-world role model. Perhaps no other company
figures as prominently in the book, and many of the lessons end with
Nintendo as the victor, deservingly triumphant after executing innova-
tive, intelligent, and, above all, rational strategies. In contrast to
Nintendo, the authors often cast antitrust enforcement agencies as the
arch-villains of their lessons-the sand in the gears of economic pro-
gress and prosperity.
As in any satisfying narrative, these antagonists are inevitably
trounced-their half-cocked theories proven wrong and their cases
dismissed, if not voluntarily withdrawn. Following one of many
Nintendo success stories, for example, the authors discuss a Justice
Department investigation of Nintendo in the early 1990s. 164 After ex-
plaining the allegations against Nintendo, the authors quote exten-
sively from a scathing editorial by the business-weekly Barron's,
which suggests that:
The legion of trustbusting lawyers would be far more productively
occupied playing Super Mario Brothers 3 than bringing cases of this
kind.... In their pursuit of... crooks, we wish the trustbusters well.
But [they] are in equally hot pursuit of Nintendo and other real
business success stories, real achievements, real technological pro-
gress and real rewards.165
163. For example, the authors discuss a scheme by General Motors (together with Firestone,
Mack Trucks, Phillips Petroleum and Standard Oil) in the 1920s and '30s, in which the company
bought up local trolley franchises around the country and shut them down, in order to spur the
automobile business. Id. at 106-07. As the authors note, "[a]lthough effective, the strategy was
also highly illegal. It was a clear violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 107.
The authors further discussion of the trivial legal consequences the companies faced suggests
that the companies made the right move, as "[tihe courts fined GM and its coconspirators $5000
each .... So a mere slap on the wrist for GM and its fellow conspirators." Id. The authors are
quick to follow with another disclaimer, noting that, "[t]oday the U.S. courts take a much more
serious view of antitrust violations." Id. Nonetheless, their General Motors vignette ultimately
ends with an endorsement of market consolidation and concentration, noting that "there are
some circumstances-a declining industry, for example-in which it's both appropriate and legal
to acquire competitors in order to rationalize industry capacity." Id.
164. Id. at 115-17.
165. Id. at 117 (quoting Barron's, Dec. 23, 1991).
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"A year later," the authors add, "the government dropped its
investigation." 166
D. Encouraging Strategic Non-Verbal Communications
Between Competitors
In much the same way that a joint venture agreement among com-
petitors may employ "strategic ambiguity, ' 167 the authors of Co-opeti-
tion suggest that it may often be wise to "maintain a fog over what
could happen" if a relationship with another party were to break
down-"not necessarily a thick fog, but definitely some fog."' 1 68 They
advise that, "[i]n business relationships, just as in marital relation-
ships, some thoughts are better left unspoken."'1 69 In other words,
"[s]ome ... threats ... are better left implicit. ' 170 The implicit threat
is, of course, an essential part of what makes mutual investment and
risk-sharing such effective trust-facilitating devices. 171 By creating im-
plicit contingencies and interdependencies, a joint venture among
competitors can extinguish their incentive and ability to compete.
E. Recognizing the Links Between Games: Overlaps and
Interdependence Among Markets and Players
Co-opetition urges executives to create, understand, and exploit
links between "games" among common players-or, in other words,
links between markets among common competitors. Although the au-
thors do not specifically address joint ventures, they advocate ex-
ploitation of the same principles that underlie trust-facilitating
devices-the mechanisms by which joint ventures among competitors
can so effectively encourage, enable, and reinforce collusion. First, the
authors instruct the reader to recognize the links between games:
"Start with the [p]layers. Anytime there's a player in your game who's
also a player in another game, the two games are potentially linked.
The player in common could be ... any of your ... competitors."'172
As they explain, "two games become one larger game" if a player "be-
166. Id. at 117; see also id. at 192-93 (describing another apparently well-deserved loss for
antitrust enforcers: the FTC's failed case against Du Pont and Ethyl Corp, challenging the com-
panies use of most-favored-customer (or "MFC") clauses).
167. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
168. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 219.
169. Id. at 218.
170. Id.
171. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how strategic ambiguity in a joint venture agreement
among competitors may increase the level of ongoing, shared risk, and thus serve as a trust-
facilitating device).
172. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 235.
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lieves that what will happen in one of them is contingent on what hap-
pens in the other. '173 Thus, "by creating . . . these perceptions of
linkage" one can "change the boundaries of the game."'174 The authors
suggest a variety of ways to "creat[e] a perceptual linkage": "[t]hreats
and promises are the classic examples," and "setting a precedent is
another tactic designed to link games. ' 175 In other words, "You take
an action in a game today to convince people of what you'll do next
time you're in a similar game."'71 6 Establishing a series of positive
precedents is, of course, the key to creating the trust necessary to
solve the prisoner's dilemmas.'77
The authors further explain that "[t]he links can be very tight or
very loose: an explicit threat or promise to act in a certain way, or a
vague hint of general policy."' 78 In any event, the authors emphasize,
"[tihe key ingredient for linkage is contingency: another player must
believe that what you will do in one game depends on what happens in
another. Or you believe that he believes this. Or he believes that you
believe this."'1 79 By creating contingencies such as mutual investment
and risk-sharing, a joint venture among competitors can create just the
sort of links the Co-opetition authors suggest. Such linkage creates a
strong incentive for those competitors to cooperate in the markets in
which they compete.
The authors' advice on linking games is part of a broader message
about looking beyond the immediate "game" (i.e., market) and recog-
nizing that "every game takes place in a larger context."' 80 This larger
context "is what allows a game's boundaries to be expanded or simply
moved.' 8' In other words, "You may think you know what game
you're playing, but that game is invariably part of a larger one. That's
a good message to end with. There's always a LARGER game.' 82 Co-
opetition thus urges corporate executives to create and exploit links
between markets and foster interdependence among market players.
The trust-facilitating devices created by a joint venture allow competi-
tors to appreciate the so-called "larger game," even if the venture's
market is entirely distinct from that in which the competitors compete.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
178. BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION, supra note 10, at 254.
179. Id. (emphasis in original).
180. Id. at 260.
181. Id.
182. Id. (emphasis in original).
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IV. MODERN ANTITRUST DOCTRINE REGARDING
JOINT VENTURES
The anticompetitive, trust-facilitating possibilities of joint ventures
are not recognized under current antitrust analysis. This part discusses
the legal standards and the existing framework under which joint ven-
tures are analyzed, including the Collaboration Guidelines jointly au-
thored by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Justice
Department. While current joint venture doctrine, generally, and the
Guidelines, specifically, encourage analysis of factors that are closely
related to the trust-facilitating devices highlighted in this Article, they
ultimately fall short of recognizing any of the three devices.
A. Modern Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures Fails to Recognize
the Risks of Trust-Facilitating Devices
This section considers how and why current antitrust doctrine re-
garding the analysis of joint ventures fails to recognize the trust-facili-
tating devices highlighted by this article.
1. Overview of Modern Antitrust Doctrine
Regarding Joint Ventures
a) Legal Standards Under the Sherman Act § 1 vs. the
Clayton Act § 7
Although existing case law and frameworks for antitrust analysis of
joint ventures do not currently recognize the risks posed by trust-facil-
itating devices, the broad language of the core antitrust statutes effec-
tively encompasses these risks. As a technical matter, it may be
difficult to determine whether a joint venture should be analyzed as a
"combination" under Section 1 of the Sherman Act18 3 or as a sort of
merger or "acquisition" under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 8 4 This
distinction, however, is inconsequential because the same substantive
standards are applied under both statutes.185
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every ... combination ... in restraint of trade . . . is hereby
declared to be illegal.").
184. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) ("No person ... shall acquire ... any part of the stock or other
share capital ... of another person engaged also in commerce... where in any line of commerce
•.. the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.").
185. See 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2121c, at 128. The prohibition in
Section 5 of the FTC Act against "unfair methods of competition," see 15 U.S.C. § 18, may
provide even broader limits on anticompetitive conduct than either Section 1 of the Sherman
Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act, since the FTC Act requires neither a "contract, combination
or conspiracy" nor an "acquisition." See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729
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Assuming the joint venture's proponents can offer some ostensibly
legitimate procompetitive justification, a joint venture is generally an-
alyzed under the rule of reason.186 As Professor Hovenkamp explains,
"[a]t the highest level of generality, joint ventures benefit participants
either by permitting them to exercise market power or by reducing
their costs" but "[o]nly the latter produces a public benefit. ' 187
Hovenkamp also notes that because joint ventures often result in
procompetitive benefits such as cost reductions, "the legal and eco-
nomic literature on joint ventures is largely favorable toward them,
and antitrust generally begins .. . with a presumption of legality. ' 188
Thus a joint venture should "be condemned or restrained only if the
opportunities for increased exercise of market power appear signifi-
cant in proportion to the likely benefits. '189
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is already understood to prohibit joint
ventures among competitors where, under a rule of reason analysis,
the anticompetitive risks are found to outweigh the likely procompeti-
tive benefits. 190 This Article proposes that the three trust-facilitating
devices highlighted here should be added to the list of recognized an-
ticompetitive risks that a joint venture among competitors may pose.
b) Comparing Pre- and Post-Joint-Venture HHIs:
A Threshold Test
An essential preliminary step in the analysis of a joint venture is to
assess the concentration levels of each of the markets potentially af-
fected by the venture, though this tool is a threshold test that provides
only limited insight. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") is per-
haps the most widely-used measure of market concentration in anti-
trust law. 191 If the HHI indicates concentration levels for a potentially
affected market are low, then the likelihood the venture poses serious
anticompetitive risks is minimal. If, however, the HHI reveals high
F.2d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that, in enacting the FTC Act, "Congress's aim was to
protect society against oppressive anticompetitive conduct and thus assure that the conduct pro-
hibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts would be supplemented as necessary and any intersti-
ces filled"). But this distinction is not material to the issues discussed here, because joint
ventures of the sort with which this Article is concerned can almost always be characterized as a
"combination," and thus can be analyzed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See 13
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2122c, at 128.
186. See Richard W. Pogue, Antitrust Considerations in Forming a Joint Venture, 54 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 926-27 (1985).
187. 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, $ 2121b, at 125-26.
188. Id. T 2121b, at 126-27 (emphasis added).
189. Id. I 2121b, at 127.
190. See infra notes 242-245 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, $ 2122b, at 133.
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concentrations, it signifies only that further inquiry is necessary to de-
termine the likelihood of serious anticompetitive effects.
In the context of a hypothetical production joint venture similar to
that at issue in In re General Motors Corp.,192 Hovenkamp discusses
the use of HHIs as a method of analyzing the competitive impact of a
joint venture. He argues that a comparison of HHIs "hardly tells the
whole story or even a meaningful portion of it."' 193 Rather, he sug-
gests, as does this Article, that "the real threat from the proposed ven-
ture is that the two participants will collude or develop facilitators that
enable them to achieve tacit coordination of prices. ' 194 Hovenkamp is
quick to point out, however, "that while the HHI has increased fol-
lowing the joint venture, the HHI increase has resulted from increased
market output and the relative disadvantage imposed on the nonven-
turing rivals." 195 Thus, he suggests that, "[i]n sum.., purely structural
evidence often tells us almost nothing about the impact of a joint
venture."', 96
Nonetheless, a structural analysis of the relevant markets using
HHI comparisons can answer some threshold questions. Hovenkamp
provides a useful framework for the limited use of HHIs to assess the
implications of market concentration: 197
* Low HHI levels. "At low levels of concentration HHI numbers
are relevant in providing a safe harbor below which competitive
concerns cannot be inferred from structure alone.' 198
* High HHI levels and a joint venture that completely eliminates
competition between its parents. "At higher levels of concentra-
tion, durable joint ventures that completely eliminate existing
competition between the venturers should be regarded with
greater concern; as a first cut one might ask whether a complete
merger between the two parties would be lawful .... 199
* High HHI Levels and a joint venture that does not completely
eliminate competition between its parents. "At higher levels of
concentration, if the joint venture does not eliminate all existing
192. 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984), vacated, 116 F.T.C. 1276 (1993). The General Motors case involved
a production joint venture between General Motors and Toyota to build and jointly operate a
new production facility for automobiles. For further discussion of General Motors, see infra
notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
193. See 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2122b, at 134.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. T 2122b, at 135.
197. Id.
198. 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2122b, at 135 (Hovenkamp suggests
that "an HHI of 1000, similar to that which is used for the analysis of mergers, seems about
right.").
199. Id. I 2122b, at 135.
2008]
104 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
competition between the venturers, the purely structural analy-
sis can do no more than begin the inquiry. 200
Thus, HHI numbers that demonstrate low levels of concentration pro-
vide a strong presumption of legality for a joint venture. And for a
joint venture that completely eliminates competition between the ven-
ture's parents, HHIs indicating high levels of concentration may re-
quire analyzing the venture as if it were a merger. But for a joint
venture that does not completely eliminate competition between play-
ers in a highly concentrated market-the factual scenario with which
this Article is primarily concerned-HHIs provide only a starting
point: an indication that further analysis of the venture is necessary.
2. The Problematic Polarization of Joint Venture Analysis Along
Two Routes: Quasi-Merger vs. Front for Cartel
In his antitrust treatise, Hovenkamp provides a comprehensive
characterization of the treatment of joint ventures under modern anti-
trust doctrine. He distinguishes between "two general routes" of joint
venture analysis: (1) "a structural analysis very roughly similar to that
applied to mergers"; or (2) a challenge to "a particular portion of the
joint venture agreement thought to limit competition excessively. '20 1
This Article is concerned with the limitations of both routes of anal-
ysis, which-due largely to the fact that they are distinct, non-overlap-
ping paths-may fail to consider the broader anticompetitive aspects
of certain joint ventures. The first category of analysis is based on the
idea that a joint venture in a concentrated market, similar to a merger
in such a market, may "reduce by one the number of market partici-
pants. '20 2 Depending on how the joint venture is structured, however,
it may or may not have such a result.20 3 Hovenkamp points out, for
example, that "the only production joint venture that is structurally
similar to the complete merger is the most extreme one, which is rela-
tively uncommon: two firms agree to construct and operate a joint
production facility and to close down all independently owned facili-
ties." 204 More commonly, the joint venture parents "agree to make
jointly some product that both had made prior to the arrangement and
will continue making separately during the joint venture period."20 5
Instead of reducing the number of competitors, in many cases a joint
200. Id. I 2122b, at 136.
201. Id. 2122a, at 130-31.
202. Id. 2122b, at 131.
203. 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2122b, at 131.
204. Id.
205. Id. I 2122b, at 132.
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venture may actually add a new competitor to the market, such as
when it creates a new, independent firm with different owners. 20 6
Likewise, if a joint venture involves the construction of a new plant, it
may actually increase the market's total production capacity-an ef-
fect which is, on its face, procompetitive.
When a joint venture adds a new, nominally independent competi-
tor to a market, the threat to competition may come not from a de-
crease in the number of market participants, but from the possibility
that the venture eliminates existing competition between the joint
venture participants in markets outside of the venture.20 7 According
to Hovenkamp, "[t]his might happen if the joint venture becomes an
excuse for price fixing with respect to the venturers' nonventure busi-
ness or if it creates or makes more likely the use of some price-fixing
'facilitator,' such as information exchanges, potentially anticompeti-
tive standardization of products or contract terms, joint sales, or the
like." 208
What current antitrust analysis of joint ventures fails to scrutinize is
the likelihood that the mere existence of the joint venture, as opposed
to its particular activities or operations, may facilitate price-fixing. Ex-
isting doctrine recognizes that even if a joint venture is more than
merely "an excuse for price-fixing," it may facilitate collusion or oth-
erwise reduce competition between its parents. But once the analysis
dismisses the possibility that the venture is merely a front for naked
restraints (such as price-fixing, production caps, or territorial alloca-
tions), the inquiry tends to be limited to the specifics of the joint ven-
ture agreement, such as whether the joint venture opens the door to
"information exchanges, potentially anticompetitive standardization
of products or contract terms, joint sales, or the like. '209 Left out of
these considerations are the potential risks inherent in the venture,
such as mutual investment, the creation of an interlocking directorate,
and the uncertainties (or strategic ambiguities) 210 that may be created,
depending on how explicitly the joint venture agreement articulates
the future management and operations of the venture.
Take, for example, Hovenkamp's criticism of the dissent in the
FTC's General Motors decision.211 The case involved a production
joint venture between General Motors and Toyota to build and jointly
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2122b, at 132.
209. See id.
210. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
211. See 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 1 2122b, at 133 (citing In re General
Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984), vacated, 116 F.T.C. 1276 (1993)).
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operate a new facility to manufacture automobiles. The dissenting
commissioner argued the venture should be condemned because the
market in question (automobiles) "is prone to effective collusion, and
a collaboration between two major competitors resembles a partial
merger more than a true joint venture. '212 First, Hovenkamp argues
"the construction of an additional plant by the joint venturers, with no
added limitation on the number of their independently owned plants
or their output, can hardly be likened to a complete merger of the
firms. ' 213 Second, Hovenkamp contends the joint venture in question
should not be analyzed in terms of its ability to facilitate collusion
between its parents because "two firms contemplating collusion, with
its attendant output reduction, would not ordinarily undertake to
build an additional plant. ' 214 As discussed above, however, amidst a
multi-year price-fixing conspiracy in the DRAM industry, Infineon
contemplated forming just such a joint venture with its competitor,
Toshiba-a venture that would likely increase the market's overall
production capacity.215 Hovenkamp's criticism thus evinces the unnec-
essary rigidness and polarity of the existing doctrine: if a joint venture
is not a cover for collusion among its parents, then it is deemed unnec-
essary to analyze the venture's broader collusion-facilitating effects.
Current joint venture analysis tends to be bifurcated, analyzing a
joint venture as either (a) a possible front for cartel behavior, or (b) a
partial integration of the joint ventures' parents-a sort of quasi-
merger, analyzed like a merger.216 This polarized analysis neglects a
vast area of middle ground that is just as fertile for anticompetitive
relations. Under the current doctrine, if the analysis takes the merger-
analogy route, then the product market of the joint venture is the fo-
cus. If, on the other hand, the analysis takes the collusion-facilitation
route, then the attention shifts to the internal mechanics of the joint
venture itself. For example, such an analysis may question whether the
joint venture agreement or operating structure provides for (1) infor-
mation exchange between the parents; (2) price-fixing; (3) territorial
allocations; or (4) output reductions by the parents.217
212. See id. (quoting General Motors, 103 F.T.C. 374).
213. See id. (emphasis added).
214. See id.
215. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
216. As Areeda and Hovenkamp explain, "[s]ome 'joint ventures' are in fact little more than
fronts for cartels and, having no lawful purpose, are properly dissolved by antitrust decree.
Other joint ventures integrate the participants so completely that they are analyzed in the same
way as mergers and can thus be enjoined under merger standards of illegality." 7 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 19, 1478a, at 319.
217. See, e.g., 13 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, 2122b, at 136.
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Much has been written regarding the first question-possible infor-
mation-sharing implications of joint ventures, such as sharing of pro-
duction numbers, sales forecasts, and marketing plans.218 In many
cases, however, this sort of information could be exchanged legally
outside the context of the joint venture. 219 And even if it could not be,
proof of such exchanges does not, without more, suffice to establish a
price-fixing conspiracy. 220 The current analysis also considers whether
the joint venture agreement contains provisions that effectively fix
prices, reduce output, or allocate territories in the context of competi-
tion outside the venture. 221 Each of these possibilities, of course, is
itself illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, whether it occurs in
the context of a joint venture or elsewhere. 222
What current analyses fail to consider are the broader collusive ef-
fects that a joint venture may give rise to by virtue of the competitive
markets in which its parents are involved and the trust-facilitating de-
vices that the venture entails. These devices are fundamentally distin-
guishable from the previously recognized anticompetitive risks that
arise from a joint venture's operational structure or the particular
terms of a joint venture agreement.
3. Acknowledgment of Possibility of "Spillovers," But No
Substantive Principles to Guide Analysis of These Effects
As characterized by Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, modern
antitrust doctrine acknowledges the possibility of "spillovers" but pro-
vides little guidance on how to recognize or analyze these effects.223
They discuss, for example, the "competitive dangers" posed by a joint
venture between competitors, acknowledging the possibility that the
"combination may diminish the parents' zeal for competing with each
other in any market in which they overlap. ' 224 Here again, however,
the authors focus their analysis and discussion on the competitiveness
of the market in which the joint venture itself is engaged.225
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 657 F.2d 971, 981 (8th Cir. 1981) (condemning an
agreement requiring that one of the joint venture's parents "not engage in any competitive ef-
forts in the United States market with non-joint-venture outboard motors").
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
223. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 19, 1478bl, at 320 ("The
courts examine not only the immediate harms and benefits of a venture, but also... the proba-
ble spillovers on the parents' other activities.").
224. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 124, 1 703c, at 157.
225. See id. 1 703c, at 157-58 ("[T]he combination may diminish the parents' zeal for compet-
ing with each other in any market in which they overlap. The future behavior of each parent and
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Areeda and Hovenkamp raise the hypothetical example of a mo-
nopolist that attempts to create a joint venture with one of its actual
or potential competitors-a scenario for which, they advise, "antitrust
must be presumptively inhospitable. 12 26 While acknowledging "the
possibility of redeeming virtue sufficient to justify such a venture," the
authors argue that "only the most compelling justifications should be
accepted. 1122 7 Areeda and Hovenkamp's hypothetical is narrowly
posed, nested within a chapter on monopolization, and specifically
considers a monopolist. Indeed, this is a rather extreme example and,
consequently, an easy case. The logic underlying their observation,
however, is consistent with the thesis of this Article and could be ex-
tended beyond monopolists. Take, for example, a market involving
three equally dominant producers, rather than a monopolist. The
trust-facilitating risks of a joint venture between two of the producers
(although neither is a monopolist) may likewise be so great as to out-
weigh any potential procompetitive effects. 228
4. Risk-Sharing, Often Cast As a Procompetitive Virtue, Can
Be Equally Effective As a Trust-Facilitating Device
Risk-sharing between joint venture partners is often cast by anti-
trust commentators as a procompetitive virtue weighing in favor of
the legality of a joint venture. As illustrated above, however, risk-
sharing may just as readily be construed as a trust-facilitating device
with anticompetitive implications. 229 In their short list of "possible le-
gitimate objectives of joint activity," Areeda and Hovenkamp men-
tion risk-sharing first.230 Their precise language suggests that risk-
sharing in itself is not virtuous; rather, it is risk-sharing that allows two
firms to "form a joint subsidiary to undertake an activity too risky for
either parent alone.'" 231 Nevertheless, many other commentators fail to
articulate this distinction and suggest risk-sharing is an inherently
procompetitive feature of joint ventures among competitors.232
its subsidiary is likely to be restrained: each is less likely to enter the other's market than if they
were totally unrelated; and if, say, one or more parents do enter the subsidiary's market, produc-
tion and price decisions will inevitably be interrelated.").
226. Id. I 703c, at 158.
227. Id.
228. Indeed, this is arguably the case with the Gustafson joint venture between Crompton &
Knowles and Bayer. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text; infra notes 266-272 and
accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.C.3.
230. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 124, 703c, at 157.
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. See, e.g., Deborah P. Herman et al., Effective Interactions and Coordination in Multi-
Party Antitrust Trials, SG065 ALI/ABA 411, 426 (2001) (stating that "[t]o survive antitrust scru-
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If, as proposed above, risk-sharing is an effective mechanism for
building trust among competitors, the perception of risk-sharing as a
presumptively procompetitive feature of joint ventures may be doubly
flawed. Consider, for example, the case of a joint venture between
competitors that would not be too risky for either parent to undertake
alone. First, if the joint venture entails sharing substantial risk, ex-
isting doctrine would fail to weigh this trust-facilitating device against
the legality of the venture. Second, existing doctrine may further com-
pound this error by presumptively viewing the risk-sharing as procom-
petitive and thus weigh an anticompetitive risk in favor of the legality
of the venture.
B. The Collaboration Guidelines Overlook the Risks
Posed by Trust-Facilitating Devices
The Collaboration Guidelines, issued jointly by the Federal Trade
Commission and the United States Department of Justice in 2000,233
provide a general statement of federal antitrust enforcement policy
regarding joint ventures. As discussed below, the Guidelines, like
modern antitrust doctrine generally, stop short of recognizing the an-
ticompetitive risks posed by trust-facilitating devices.
1. Overview of the Collaboration Guidelines
Under the Guidelines, a joint venture may be either challenged as
per se illegal234 or analyzed under the rule of reason, depending on
the particular facts of the case.235 The discussion here, however, is lim-
ited to analysis under the rule of reason because the trust-facilitating
effects of joint ventures at the focus of this Article are not the sort of
naked restraints on trade that can be characterized as presumptively
illegal.
Under the rule of reason, an agency begins its analysis by examining
the nature of the agreement, specifically, "the business purpose of the
agreement and ... whether the agreement, if already in operation, has
tiny, a horizontal alliance must demonstrate procompetitive effects, such as the ... sharing of
risk"); Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Anal-
ysis, 64 ANTrrRUST L.J. 19, 30 (1995) (noting that "joint research ventures, like production joint
ventures, often provide procompetitive benefits" such as "sharing the substantial economic risks
involved").
233. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13.
234. Id. § 3.2, at 8-9 ("Agreements of a type that always or almost always tends to raise price
or reduce output are per se illegal.").
235. Id. § 3.3, at 10-11 ("Agreements not challenged as per se illegal are analyzed under the
rule of reason to determine their overall competitive effect.").
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caused anticompetitive harm. '236 The Guidelines recognize that
"[m]arkets affected by a competitor collaboration... may... include
additional markets in which any participant is an actual or potential
competitor," even if the joint venture does not operate in that mar-
ket.237 Thus the likelihood of anticompetitive effects must be assessed
with respect to any market potentially affected by the joint venture.
As part of this preliminary inquiry, the agencies define the relevant
markets, calculate market shares, and assess market concentration. 238
This initial analysis leads to one of three outcomes. If the examina-
tion concludes that due to the nature of the agreement and an absence
of market power, there is no anticompetitive harm, then the inquiry
ends and the agencies do not challenge the venture. 239 If the analysis
determines either that anticompetitive harm is likely due to the nature
of the agreement or that anticompetitive harm has already resulted,
then the agencies will challenge the venture without a comprehensive
market analysis.240 If the inquiry indicates only "possible competitive.
concerns," then the agencies will analyze the venture in greater
depth.241
While all three possibilities are relevant here, the third is particu-
larly central to this Article. The trust-facilitating devices highlighted
by this Article are unlikely to be problematic if the joint venture's
parents cumulatively lack market power in a given market (as in the
first possible outcome). At the same time, the likelihood of anticom-
petitive harm from these devices will not necessarily be evident from
the nature of the agreement (as in the second possible outcome).
Rather, these devices are likely to raise competitive concerns that re-
quire a more rigorous analysis of both the joint venture itself and the
venture's parents' cumulative market power in the markets in which
they compete.
236. Id. § 3.3, at 10 (footnotes omitted).
237. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.32, at 16 (footnotes omit-
ted). A footnote to the quoted language further recognizes that "[plarticipation in the collabora-
tion may change the participants' behavior in this third category of markets, for example, by
altering incentives and available information, or by providing an opportunity to form additional
agreements among participants." Id. § 3.32, at 16 n.41. The Guidelines provide no guidance, how-
ever, as to how, why, or when an agreement might "[alter] incentives" or "provid[e] an opportu-
nity to form additional agreements" regarding a market that is collateral to the joint venture.
238. Id. § 3.3, at 11 (footnotes omitted).
239. Id. § 3.3, at 10 (footnotes omitted).
240. Id. § 3.3, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
241. Id. § 3.3, at 11 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). This analysis typically requires
"defin[ing] relevant markets and calculat[ing] market shares and concentration as an initial step
in assessing whether the agreement may [a] create or increase market power or [b] facilitate its
exercise and thus [pose] risks to competition." Id.
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If a more rigorous analysis of market power and the joint venture is
required, then the agencies consider the extent to which the parents
and the joint venture have the ability and incentive to compete with
each other.242 If this more thorough inquiry indicates that anticompe-
titive harm is unlikely, then the agencies end their investigation with-
out considering procompetitive benefits. 243 If, however, the more
rigorous examination indicates a likelihood of anticompetitive harm,
the agencies examine whether the venture is reasonably necessary to
achieve procompetitive benefits that would likely offset the anticom-
petitive harms.244 Thus, in accord with modern antitrust doctrine gen-
erally, the Guidelines require that any potential anticompetitive harms
ultimately be weighed against any likely procompetitive benefits in
order to determine the legality of a joint venture.245
2. Trust-Facilitating Devices Are Outside the Scope of Factors
Currently Recognized by the Collaboration Guidelines
While the Guidelines provide a sound general framework for ana-
lyzing joint ventures, they fail to properly recognize trust-facilitating
risks. With general recommendations to analyze the "nature of the
relevant agreement," the Guidelines take small steps toward, but
nonetheless stop short of, recognizing trust-facilitating devices. 246 The
Guidelines note, for example, that "by limiting independent decision
making or combining control over or financial interests in production,
key assets, or decisions on price, output, or other competitively sensi-
tive variables, an agreement may create or increase market power or
facilitate its exercise by the collaboration, its participants, or both." 247
At first glance, this statement might seem to cover the risks high-
lighted above; the general risk of "limiting independent decision mak-
ing" might appear to incorporate interlocking directorates, and
"combining control over financial interests" might seem to include
mutual investment by the venture's parents. A closer reading, how-
ever, reveals this statement is too narrowly tailored to encompass any
of the three trust-facilitating devices. The specificity with which the
242. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.3, at 11. The Collaboration
Guidelines specify particular factors which may be considered under this more-rigorous analysis,
such as: (1) "whether an agreement is exclusive or non-exclusive and its duration"; (2) "whether
entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or counteract any anticompetitive harms";
and (3) "any other market circumstances that may foster or impede anticompetitive harms." Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. § 3.3, at 11-12.
245. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
246. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.31, at 12.
247. Id.
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terms are qualified indicates the risks are relevant only with respect to
the "production, key assets, or decisions on price, output, or other
competitively sensitive variables" of the joint venture.248
The Guidelines thus reveal concern only about the anticompetitive
risks posed by parent's control over, and interest in, the particular
competitively-sensitive variables within a joint venture. This narrow
scope of analysis excludes the anticompetitive risks posed by the
macro-level appendages of the parents that form the broader contours
of the joint venture-mutual investment, interlocking directorates,
and risk-sharing.
Perhaps the closest the Guidelines come to recognizing the risks of
trust-facilitating devices is in the statement that, "An agreement also
may increase the likelihood of an exercise of market power by facili-
tating explicit or tacit collusion, either through facilitating practices
such as an exchange of competitively sensitive information or through
market concentration. '249 Here, the Guidelines recognize that a joint
venture may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion. Once again, however,
this recognition is limited to: (1) "facilitating practices," such as the
exchange of information, and (2) increased "market concentration."
The "facilitating practices" to which the Guidelines refer presumably
do not (but should) include the trust-facilitating devices highlighted by
this Article. Likewise, reference to "market concentration" was likely
intended to refer to literal increases in market concentration-such as
would result from a production joint venture in which each parent
shut down its individual production facilities-rather than the effec-
tive (but non-literal) increases in market concentration that may result
from trust-facilitating devices.
The Guidelines' failure to recognize trust-facilitating devices is fur-
ther confirmed by their elaboration on the relevant factors for analy-
sis. The Guidelines specify six factors concerning "the ability and
incentive of the participants and the collaboration to compete. '250 Of
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 3.34, at 18-19. The six factors are:
(1) "the extent to which the relevant agreement is non-exclusive in that participants
are likely to continue to compete independently outside the collaboration in the
market in which the collaboration operates";
(2) "the extent to which participants retain independent control of assets necessary to
compete";
(3) "the nature and extent of participants' financial interests in the collaboration or in
each other";
(4) "the control of the collaboration's competitively significant decision making";
(5) "the likelihood of anticompetitive information sharing"; and
(6) "the duration of the collaboration."
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these six factors, only the third and fourth are directly relevant to the
trust-facilitating devices highlighted by this Article. The third factor,
"the nature and extent of participants' financial interests in the collab-
oration or in each other," might appear to encompass significant mu-
tual investment, the first trust-facilitating device highlighted by this
Article. Likewise, the fourth factor, "control of the collaboration's
competitively significant decision making" is related to interlocking
directorates, the second trust-facilitating device.
Again, however, the Guidelines' elaboration on each makes clear
that these factors do not encompass anticompetitive risks of the sort
considered by this Article. For example, in discussing the third factor,
the "financial interests in the collaboration or each other," the Guide-
lines state that, "[i]n general, the greater the financial interest in the
collaboration, the less likely is the participant to compete with the col-
laboration."'251 The Guidelines thus stop short of recognizing that the
greater the financial interest in the collaboration, the less likely the
participant is to compete with fellow participants. 252 Similarly, under
the Guidelines, an agency would "also assess direct equity investments
between or among participants," as these "may reduce the incentives
of the participants to compete with each other. ' 25 3 Here again, how-
ever, the Guidelines' language is narrowly constructed, acknowledging
the risk of competitors' direct investments in each other (a risk long-
recognized under antitrust doctrine),254 but failing to recognize that
significant mutual investment in a third entity (the joint venture) may
have comparable anticompetitive effects. The Guidelines thus come
close to, but ultimately fail to recognize, one of the key anticompeti-
tive risks highlighted by this Article: the greater the participant's fi-
nancial interest in the collaboration, the less likely the participant is to
compete with another participant.
In discussing the fourth factor, "control of the collaboration's com-
petitively significant decision making," the Guidelines explain the
agencies' concern as "the extent to which the collaboration's govern-
Id.
251. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(c), at 20 (emphasis
added).
252. See supra Part II.C.1.
253. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(c), at 20 (emphasis
added).
254. See, e.g., Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (2006)) (prohibiting acquisition by one corporation of "the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital ... of another [corporation] ... where in any line of commerce... the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition"); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (approving, based in part on antitrust policies, FCC rules that
prohibit cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast media outlets in the same market).
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ance structure enables the collaboration to act as an independent deci-
sion maker. ' 255 Again, although this language might seem to embrace
the anticompetitive risks posed by indirect interlocking directorates,
the Guidelines make clear that this factor should be concerned with
the competitive motivations of the joint venture, not its parents.256
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE COLLABORATION
GUIDELINES: RECOGNIZING THE RISKS OF TRUST-
FACILITATING DEVICES
Although the Collaboration Guidelines do not bind courts, they are
a statement of general policy for federal antitrust enforcement agen-
cies. 257 Furthermore, like the FTC-DOJ Merger Guidelines,258 the
Collaboration Guidelines are likely to influence judicial decisionmak-
ing.259 It is important, therefore, that the Collaboration Guidelines
recognize and acknowledge serious anticompetitive risks, such as
those posed by significant mutual investment, indirect interlocking di-
rectorates, and sharing of substantial, ongoing risk. This section pro-
poses modifications to the Guidelines that would recognize these three
trust-facilitating devices.
First, the Guidelines would effectively recognize significant mutual
investments by adding the following proposed language (which is un-
derlined) to Section 3.34(c): "In general, the greater the financial in-
terest in the collaboration, the less likely is the participant to compete
with the collaboration or the other participants. '2 60  Indeed, the
Guidelines already provide the useful insight that "the analysis is sen-
sitive to the level of financial interest ... relative to the level of the
255. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(d), at 20.
256. Id. The Guidelines explain that "[i]n general, the collaboration is less likely to compete
independently as participants gain greater control over the collaboration's price, output, and
other competitively significant decisions." Id. (emphasis added).
257. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
258. FrC-DOJ, MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 111.
259. See David Lee, The Lack of Guidance for Proving the Pricing-Below-Cost Element of
Predatory Pricing and a Call for a Revised Approach to Predatory Pricing, 56 ADMIN. L. REv.
1285, 1305 n.132 (2004) (noting that the antitrust agencies are generally "influential on the courts
as evidenced by, for example, the courts regular use of the FTCJDOJ Merger Guidelines in
merger cases"); see also William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207,
235 (2003) (noting that "review of the case law shows that the Merger Guidelines have been
influential in shaping the courts' approach to efficiencies, just as they have been in other areas").
260. Compare FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(c), at 20. Sec-
tion 3.34(c) of the Guidelines provides a description of the third factor "relevant to the ability
and incentive of the participants and the collaboration to compete," which is entitled "Financial
Interests in the Collaboration or in Other Participants," see id., and which is discussed above in
supra text accompanying notes 251-254.
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participant's investment in its independent business operations in the
markets affected by the collaboration. '261 The addition of the pro-
posed text would provide a general framework for analysis of signifi-
cant mutual investment which, as discussed above, hinges on the ratio
of a company's investment in the joint venture to that company's an-
nual sales in a market in which it competes with any of the joint ven-
ture's other parents. 262
Second, the Guidelines would effectively recognize indirect inter-
locking directorates by adding the following suggested language
(which is underlined) to Section 3.34(d):
The Agencies consider the manner in which a collaboration is or-
ganized and governed in assessing the extent to which participants
and their collaboration have the ability and incentive to compete
independently. Thus, the Agencies consider the extent to which the
collaboration's governance structure enables the collaboration and
its participants to act as aft independent decision makers and inde-
pendent competitors.263
With these modifications, the Guidelines would recognize that a joint
venture that creates an indirect interlocking directorate may pose a
risk to competition between the joint venture and any one of its par-
ents, as well as to competition between the joint ventures' parents.
Finally, the Guidelines could be modified to recognize the potential
anticompetitive harm caused by the sharing of substantial, ongoing
risk by adding the following section as a new, seventh factor relevant
to the ability and incentive of the parents and the venture to
compete: 264
3.34(g) Sharing of Substantial, Ongoing Risk.
The Agencies consider the level of ongoing risk shared by the par-
ticipants in assessing whether participants retain the ability and in-
centive to compete against each other and their collaboration. In
general, the greater the level of ongoing risk that is shared by the
participants, the less likely participants are to compete against each
other and their collaboration. Estimating the level of ongoing risk
shared by a collaboration's participants requires consideration of
261. FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(c), at 20.
262. See supra Part II.C.1.
263. Compare FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(d), at 20. Sec-
tion 3.34(d) of the Guidelines provides a description of the fourth factor "relevant to the ability
and incentive of the participants and the collaboration to compete," which is entitled "Control of
the Collaboration's Competitively Significant Decision Making," see id., and which is discussed
above in supra text accompanying notes 255-256.
264. See FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34, at 18-19. As dis-
cussed above, see supra note 250 and accompanying text, the Guidelines presently include only
six factors "relevant to the ability and incentive of the participants and the collaboration to
compete." See FTC-DOJ, COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 3.34(a)-(f), at 18-21.
2008]
116 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
the maximum long-term losses or profits that each participant in the
collaboration may potentially sustain, the likelihood of sustaining
long-term losses or profits of such magnitude, and the relative
amount of sales that each participant has in any markets in which
the participants compete with each other. Any significant ambiguity
in the terms of the relevant agreement, particularly with respect to
termination provisions (or lack thereof), is also likely to decrease
the participants' incentive to compete against each other and their
collaboration.
The addition of this language to the Guidelines would effectively rec-
ognize both the general anticompetitive risk posed by risk-sharing
among competitors, and the more specific risk entailed by joint ven-
ture agreements that employ strategic ambiguity.265
VI. CONCLUSION
The three trust-facilitating devices highlighted in this Article are
mechanisms that may increase trust among competitors who are also
partners in a joint venture, irrespective of the market in which the
joint venture operates. Where a joint venture's parents are competi-
tors in a highly concentrated market, these devices provide effective
solutions to both of the prisoner's dilemmas, as well as the third, intra-
corporate dilemma-and thus encourage, enable, and reinforce collu-
sion in the competitive market.
With the rising popularity of game-theory-inspired corporate
strategy-a trend that is perhaps best captured by Professors
Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Co-opetition-corporate executives
are ever more likely to understand the economic benefits of monopo-
lization, market power, and undersupplying a market, as well as the
advantages to be gained by establishing and exploiting "links between
games." Corporate executives are thus increasingly aware both of the
principles that make joint ventures such effective mechanisms for cre-
ating and maintaining trust among competitors and of the supra-com-
petitive profits that such trust may entail. Antitrust analysis of joint
ventures therefore should also be cognizant of these anticompetitive
effects.
The proposed modifications to the Collaboration Guidelines would
recognize the trust-facilitating effects of joint ventures among compet-
itors by adding three critical factors for antitrust enforcement agencies
to consider when analyzing joint ventures under the rule of reason.
Take, for example, the Gustafson joint venture in the seed-treatment
business, discussed above, in which Crompton & Knowles and Bayer
265. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
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each invested roughly $140 million.266 Under the analysis proposed
above in the suggested revision to Section 3.34(c) of the Guidelines,
this $140 million would be compared to the estimated $100 million in
annual sales that each company had as nominally independent com-
petitors in the rubber chemicals market. As explained above, this cal-
culation would yield a percentage ratio of 140%, indicating that the
mutual investment by each parent company in the joint venture was
highly significant with respect to each company's interest in the mar-
ket in which they compete.2 67
Given each parent company's significant mutual investment in Gus-
tafson and the fact that the potentially affected market is highly con-
centrated, 268 the Guidelines, if revised as proposed here, would have
encouraged a reviewing agency to challenge the joint venture. To the
extent that courts are influenced by the Collaborations Guidelines (as
they are by the Merger Guidelines),269 these revised Guidelines also
would have encouraged a reviewing court to block or break up the
joint venture. In actuality, however, the Gustafson joint venture was
not subject to any serious public scrutiny-much less a legal chal-
lenge-by federal antitrust agencies, either when it was formed in
1998 or at any time after.270
Five years after the formation of the Gustafson joint venture, an
investigation by the Justice Department revealed an international
price-fixing conspiracy in the rubber chemicals market that began in
1995 and lasted until 2001.271 Thus, at the time the Gustafson joint
venture was formed between Crompton and Bayer, the two compa-
nies were already co-conspirators in the rubber chemicals cartel.
Bayer and Crompton, much like the DRAM producers discussed
above,272 decided to form a joint venture even as they were en-
trenched in a multi-year global price-fixing conspiracy. The trust-facil-
itating devices created by the Gustafson joint venture likely reinforced
the conspiracy in the rubber chemicals market by substantially in-
creasing trust among two of the three dominant producers, thus help-
ing solve the three dilemmas that. price-fixing cartels inherently face.
266. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
270. A search of Westlaw and Lexis's comprehensive news archive databases yielded no evi-
dence of any antitrust challenge to the Gustafson joint venture.
271. See Rubber Chemicals Price-Fixing Probed, CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Oct. 14, 2002, at 17;
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crompton Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty for Partici-
pating in Rubber Chemicals Cartel (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
pressreleases/2004/202815.htm.
272. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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The proposed revisions to the Guidelines would counsel antitrust en-
forcement agencies-and likely courts as well-to challenge and block
joint ventures such as Gustafson that pose serious risks to the vitality
of competition among a joint venture's parents, even if the venture is
in a market separate from that in which its parents compete.
